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In this dissertation, an important homeland security problem is studied. With the
focus on wildfire and pyro-terrorism management. We begin the dissertation by studying
the vulnerability of landscapes to pyro-terrorism. We develop a maximal covering based
optimization model to investigate the impact of a pyro-terror attack on landscapes based
on the ignition locations of fires. We use three test case landscapes for experimentation.
We compare the impact of a pyro-terror wildfire with the impacts of naturally-caused
wildfires with randomly located ignition points. Our results indicate that a pyro-terror
attack, on average, has more than twice the impact on landscapes than wildfires with
randomly located ignition points.
In the next chapter, we develop a Stackelberg game model, a min-max network
interdiction framework that identifies a fuel management schedule that, with limited
budget, maximally mitigates the impact of a pyro-terror attack. We develop a
decomposition algorithm called MinMaxDA to solve the model for three test case
landscapes, located in Western U.S. Our results indicate that fuel management, even
when conducted on a small scale (when 2% of a landscape is treated), can mitigate a

pyro-terror attack by 14%, on average, comparing to doing nothing. For a fuel
management plan with 5%, and 10% budget, it can reduce the damage by 27% and 43%
on average.
Finally, we extend our study to the problem of suppression response after a pyroterror attack. We develop a max-min model to identify the vulnerability of initial attack
resources when used to fight a pyro-terror attack. We use a test case landscape for
experimentation and develop a decomposition algorithm called Bounded Decomposition
Algorithm (BDA) to solve the problem since the model has bilevel max-min structure
with binary variables in the lower level and therefore not solvable by conventional
methods. Our results indicate that although pyro-terror attacks with one ignition point can
be controlled with an initial attack, pyro-terror attacks with two and more ignition points
may not be controlled by initial attack. Also, a faster response is more promising in
controlling pyro-terror fires.
Key words: Homeland security, Stackelberg game, decomposition algorithms,
bilevel programming
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Over the last ten years, there has been an average of 75,000 wildfires per year in
the United States and an average of 7.2 million acres has burned each year [1]. Billions of
dollars are spent annually by the U.S. Forest Service for wildfire suppression [2]. The
cost of wildfires is not restricted to monetary cost, but environmental and socioeconomic
costs as well. In addition, the loss of human lives is a tremendous societal cost over the
course of a wildfire. Destructive wildfires become a primary concern in places where
major cities are located close to highly flammable vegetation areas as in Western and
Southern U.S., as well as Australia and Mediterranean Europe [3]. About 32 percent of
housing units including homes, apartments and buildings in the U.S. and 10 percent of all
lands with houses are situated in the wildland-urban interface (WUI), which is the zone
of transition between natural land and human development [4], and WUI is expected to
continue to grow [5]. With human populations reaching further into wildlands, wildfire
risk has further increased.
Along with increasing wildfire risk, the costs associated with wildfire
management have also increased. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
reported that more than $1.6 billion is spent annually by state forestry agencies on
wildfire protection, prevention, and suppression and this cost is increasing [2]. Despite
increased investments in wildfire prevention and suppression, wildfire related destruction
1

is a problem that appears to be worsening [6]. Increased wildfire activities have been
observed in the U.S. [7], Canada [8], Mediterranean Europe [9] and Australia [10].
Because of the increase in fire activities, their significant short and long term
threats to forest ecosystems, and the danger they pose to public safety and property,
wildfires have received increased public attention. There are some concerns that the
destructive power of wildfires may attract terrorist organizations to use them as a weapon
of mass destruction [11–13]. Indeed, pyro-terrorism events have been documented in
France, Spain, and Greece [11,12,14]. Pyro-terrorism is the use of large-scale arson
attacks by non-state organizations to terrorize, intimidate or coerce a government, the
civilian population, or any segment in order to advance, political or social objectives [13].
According to Baird [12], pyro-terrorism possesses the four generally accepted elements
of terrorism: targeting of noncombatants, political motivation, violence with
psychological impact and organized perpetrators. As a result, both the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federation Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are
concerned about this novel threat [15,16]. It is important for decision makers in these
departments to anticipate potential threats, and implement countermeasures to avoid a
potential devastating domestic attack. However, no study has been done to investigate the
impact of this threat and the vulnerability of landscapes and our suppression resources in
confronting such threat; nor there has been any study investigating ways to mitigate
against it. Considering the destructive power of natural wildfires, what is the potential
impact of a human-made wildfire, i.e., a pyro-terrorism attack?
Wildfire incidences require the co-occurrence of three factors: fire-conductiveweather, source of ignition and fuels, (i.e. flammable vegetation) [17]. In pyro-terrorism,
2

the adversaries can cause the joint occurrence of these three factors by providing the
sources of ignitions and choosing where, when and how many fires to start. This makes
pyro-terrorism a more destructive threat than natural wildfires. Knowing this, is a way to
mitigate pyro-terrorism? If so, how? Are existing resources available to fight natural
wildfires sufficient to fight pyro-terrorism? This dissertation explores the use of
Operations Research (OR) methods in analyzing these three questions. Specifically, this
dissertation has the following main goals: analyze the pyro-terrorism threat and
investigate the vulnerability of landscapes to such threats, examine the capability of our
resources in suppressing those fires, and investigate a way to mitigate such a hostile
activity.
Risk assessment has increasingly become a key input to the wildfire prevention
and mitigation decision making processes [18–21]. Determining the vulnerability of a
system is an important component of risk assessment, which is employed to help develop
risk mitigation strategies to counter risks [22]. Vulnerability assessment studies identify
weak points in the system, and focus on defined threats that could compromise the
system's ability to meet its intended function. To our knowledge, no risk assessment
study has considered the worst-case scenario wildfires based on fire ignition locations
and there has not been any pilot risk assessment for a potential pyro-terror attack that
utilizes coordinated multiple ignition points. The results of such study can be used in
strategic planning efforts for risk mitigation against a threat, especially when available
resources and funds are limited. This study is demonstrated in Chapter 2.
Fuels, weather condition and topography of a landscape are the three factors that
influence fire behavior, and fuel is the only factor that can be managed in the short run
3

[10]. To reduce the flammability of landscape and decrease the risk of (natural) wildfires,
fire managers use fuels management programs. Fuels management is the process of
altering the amount and structure of fuels through the construction of fuel breaks or
applications of fuel treatments such as prescribed burning, commercial harvesting and
mechanical thinning, to reduce the spread and intensity of wildfires before they occur
[23,24]. Modeling methods have been used to design efficient fuels management
programs over a landscape. Researchers have used heuristic methods [25–28] and
optimization models such as mixed integer programming [17,29–31] and stochastic
dynamic programming [32,33] for the spatial allocation of fuels management over a
landscape. All these fuels management models, however, have been developed for
reducing the impact of naturally-caused wildfires, not arson-induced fires neither pyroterrorism. To our knowledge, there is no study investigating the effectiveness of fuels
management in mitigating pyro-terrorism. Chapter 3 studies the use of fuels management
in mitigating pyro-terrorism.
Forest fire management agencies are responsible for dealing with wildland fires
and their impacts on people and forest ecosystems [34]. There are certain measures that
these management agencies take to deal with fires. The term initial attack (IA) is used by
forest fire managers to refer to the first suppression action taken on a wildfire [34]. Initial
attack is the primary attempt in suppressing a wildfire within the first several hours of fire
discovery [35] to contain the fire before it grows large and becomes difficult to control.
Although the majority of wildfire incidents between 1970 and 2002 have been reported to
be contained by initial attack, the small percentage of escaped wildfires reportedly have
caused more than 97% of the total area burned [36]. Therefore developing more efficient
4

suppression strategies including initial attack is very important for wildland management
agencies [37,38]. A number of researchers have developed two stage stochastic
programming models for addressing initial attack decision making procedure. In these
models, the acquisition and deployment decisions take place in the first stage of the
model, and to support a robust decision in the first stage, the dispatching of the resources
are decided in the second stage of the model [35,39–44]. With the increasing rate of
wildfire incidences and their severity, it is important to assess the capacity of IA in
responding to severe wildfires, specifically worst-case scenario wildfires. On the other
hand, given the existence of the threat of pyro-terrorism, it is important to evaluate the
capability of our IA against such a threat. However, to the best of our knowledge, there
have not been any studies addressing this capability. We present a vulnerability analysis
of IA capability against pyro-terrorism in Chapter 4.
Thus, the proposed contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
1.

In this research the first vulnerability assessment of landscapes to pyroterrorism is studied. The purpose of the vulnerability assessment study is
to help wildfire managers identify critical locations whose protection
yields a fire management system robust against possible worst-case
scenarios, or potential pyro-terrorism. This study can be used in
identifying these highly vulnerable areas for wildfire risk mitigation
planning such as fuels treatment scheduling and fire suppression
preparedness planning to reduce potential worst-case scenario wildfires.
To our knowledge, no risk assessment study has considered worst-case
scenario wildfires, and there has not been any pilot risk assessment for a
potential arson attack that utilizes coordinated multiple ignition points.

2.

After identifying the most vulnerable areas in a landscape, and evaluating
the impact of a pyro-terror attack, a model is developed for planning a
fuels management layout that can be used for mitigating pyro-terrorism.

5

3.

In addition, a vulnerability analysis of initial attack suppression resources
is developed for worst-case scenario wildfires and pyro-terrorism. We
examine the initial attack (IA) capacity in responding to the worst-case
scenario wildfires and pyro-terrorism. The managerial insights extracted
from this research can raise awareness and help decision makers improve
fire suppression programs.

The reset of this dissertation is organized as follows: In CHAPTER II the
vulnerability of landscapes to pyro-terrorism is studied. A mathematical programming
model is developed to assess the maximum damage that a fire can cause on a landscape
by optimally locating the ignition points. The model is used to examine the impact of
wildfire on a landscape when fire can start from multiple locations. Three case studies are
used to investigate the wildfire impacts using this model. A manuscript based on the
contents of this chapter [45] was submitted to the European Journal of Operational
Research in October 2015.
After assessing the vulnerability of landscapes to pyro-terrorism, in CHAPTER
III a mitigation strategy using fuels management is proposed to reduce the impact of a
pyro-terror attack on a landscape. This problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game
problem in which a fire manager, acting first, finds optimal locations for fuels treatments,
and the adversaries, acting second, locate ignition points to maximize the damage.
Experiments are conducted on three landscape case studies. A manuscript based on the
contents of this chapter [46] was submitted to the IIE Transactions in February 2016.
In 3.6.2, a vulnerability analysis for assessing the capacity of the current initial
attack suppression resources in the face of a pyro-terror attack is presented. This study
will go a step further than the first vulnerability assessment study presented in chapter 2
and will incorporate the capacity of suppression resources in response to a pyro-terror
attack. In case of a pyro-terror attack, the adversaries are aware of the resources deployed
6

to fire stations for an initial attack. Therefore, they can plan accordingly to maximize the
impact of their attack such that the initial attack would not be able to control the wildfire
and reduce the damage. A manuscript based on this research is under preparation for
submission to European Journal of Operational Research.
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CHAPTER II
A MAXIMAL COVERING LOCATION-BASED MODEL FOR ANALYZING THE
VULNERABILITY OF LANDSCAPES TO PYRO-TERRORISM
2.1

Introduction
Although natural fires are part of many terrestrial ecosystems [47], uncontrolled

wildfires can be destructive and can cause loss of human life and property [3].
Destructive wildfires are a primary concern in places where major cities are located close
to highly flammable vegetation areas, such as the Western and Southern U.S., Australia
and Mediterranean Europe [3]. There has been a sharp increase in fire events across the
globe [10], and the destruction caused by wildfires appears to be worsening [6]. From
2002 through 2011, wildfires in the U.S. accounted for $13.7 billion in total economic
losses, a $6.9 billion increase from the previous decade [48]. The deaths of 19 firefighters
in 2013 the largest such loss since 1933, were part of a general trend of rising threats to
lives as well as properties [48].
Wildfire risk has increased with human populations reaching further into
wildlands. About 32 percent of housing units including homes, apartments and buildings
in the U.S. and 10 percent of all lands with houses are situated in the wildland-urban
interface (WUI; the zone of transition between natural land and human development) [4],
and WUI is expected to continue to grow[5]. Homes located in the WUI have a high
probability of exposure to wildfire, regardless of vegetation type or potential fire size [2].
8

Along with increasing wildfire risk, the costs associated with wildfire management are
increasing. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) reported that more than
$ 1.6 billion is spent annually by state forestry agencies on wildfire protection,
prevention, and suppression [2]. To reduce the consequences of catastrophic wildfires,
planning an effective mitigation programs is essential.
Risk assessment has increasingly become a key input to wildfire prevention and
mitigation decision making processes [18–20,49]. Determining the vulnerability of a
system is an important component of risk assessment, which is employed to help develop
risk mitigation strategies to counter risks [22]. Vulnerability assessment studies identify
weak points in the system, and focus on defined threats that could compromise the
system's ability to meet its intended function. To our knowledge, no risk assessment
study has considered the worst-case scenario wildfires, and there has not been any pilot
risk assessment for a potential arson attack that utilizes coordinated multiple ignition
points. The results of such study can be used in strategic planning efforts for risk
mitigation against a threat, especially when available resources and funds are limited.
This paper aims to fill this gap by proposing a mathematical programming model to study
the vulnerability of landscapes to wildfires in the worst-case scenario.
Operations Research (OR) specialists have worked with fire managers to develop
decision support systems that can help improve fire management; however, there remain
substantial gaps between wildfire managers’ needs and the decision support systems used
[34]. Linear programming and mixed integer programming (MIP) have been frequently
used in wildfire management (e.g., [50–52]). Other approaches such as heuristics [25–
27,53], goal programming [54], stochastic programming [40], stochastic dynamic
9

programming [32,33], and robust optimization [39,55] also have been used in wildfire
management. In this research, we develop a mathematical programming model to
evaluate the maximum impact of a wildfire on a landscape. We use the model to analyze
the vulnerability of landscapes to wildfires based on the impact of the worst-case scenario
ignition locations.
Although wildfires can start from anywhere on a landscape, the location and
number of ignition points can be an important factor that impact the resulting wildfire
spread. Using our developed model, we investigate the effect of ignition locations on
wildfires and identify the potential ignition locations which result in a wildfire with the
maximum impact on a landscape. To model wildfires' behavior on a landscape, we use
FlamMap [56], a fire behavior mapping and analysis program. We consider wildfires that
contain a single and multiple ignition points, such as the case in lightning-caused
wildfires [57]. The proposed model is then used to evaluate the impact of wildfire on
three landscape cases from three national forests in the Western U.S.
We believe this to be the first study that analyzes the vulnerability of landscapes
to worst-case wildfires with regard to the location of ignition sites. Our ultimate goal in
this research is to help wildfire managers identify critical locations whose protection
yields a fire management system robust against possible worst-case scenarios, or
potential arson attacks. This study can be used in identifying these highly vulnerable
areas for wildfire risk mitigation planning such as fuels treatment scheduling and fire
suppression preparedness planning to reduce potential worst-case scenario wildfires.

10

2.2

Problem description and model formulation
Our objective is to identify ignition locations of a wildfire that pose the maximum

damage to the landscape. Damage or impact (used interchangeably through this paper)
can be evaluated as the percentage of the landscape burned, or the value lost to fire. For
the latter, the value of vegetation type, e.g. commercial timber, and the value of wildlandurban interface (WUI), if any, is used. We consider a landscape divided into a number of
raster cells, and use FlamMap to model fire spread characteristics in each cell. If 𝑋 is the
set of vector 𝑥 indicating the cell(s) that a fire originates from, and 𝑓(𝑥) is a function
representing the corresponding impact of the fire on the landscape, then the research
problem can be defined as identifying the ignition points, represented by vector 𝑥, of a
fire that has the largest impact on the landscape, or equivalently to find 𝑥 for which 𝑓(𝑥)
is the maximum. We formulate the problem as a network optimization problem and later
in section 3 test it on three landscape cases.
2.2.1

Modeling the spread of wildfire
To model the spread of wildfire as a network optimization problem, we represent

a landscape with a raster map divided into grid cells. If we represent the center of each
cell as a node, and connect neighboring cells with directed arcs, then the landscape can be
represented with a directed network (see Figure 2.1).

11

Figure 2.1

Rasterized landscape

(a) A landscape modeled as a 10 by 10 raster cells,
(b) The network representation of the landscape
To model the spread of fire in the landscape, we use the minimum travel time
algorithm (MTT) [58]. We study a case that multiple wildfires start at the same time
across a landscape. Therefore, to apply the MTT algorithm, we need to calculate the
minimum travel time from any cell in the network (potential ignition points) to any other
cell in the network. This requires calculating minimum travel time for a network problem
with multiple sources and multiple sinks (a source is the starting point of a travel path,
and a sink is the ending point; see [59]). In order to facilitate the construction of our
model, we convert the problem to a single-source shortest path problem by adding a
dummy super source to the network. The dummy super source represents the primary
ignition source of fire. We then use the shortest path formulation to compute the
minimum travel time from the super source to any cell in the network. The super source,
cell 0 , is connected to every cell in the network with 0 travel time. Since we
hypothetically assume wildfires start at the dummy super source, the 0 travel time
assumption is legitimate. We assume that for any cell 𝑖 (an ignition point), and any cell 𝑗
12

that fire can reach from , a single fire flow is sent from the super source to cell 𝑖 . Then
the model identifies the shortest path for sending a fire flow unit from cell 𝑖 to cell 𝑗 (in
the shortest path formulation, it is assumed that a flow unit is sent from the source to the
sink; in our formulation, hypothetically, we assume fire flow units are sent from an
ignition point to any point in a landscape). An example of this process is shown in Figure
2.2.

Figure 2.2

Modeling fire spread

The simulated wildfire (a) starts at the super source (cell 0) and arrives at ignition points
at time 0, (b) sets fire on the ignition points and spreads through the landscape
In this example, wildfire starts at the super source, travels to the three sample
ignition points, arrives at the ignition points at time 0 (simulation time) and from there
spreads through the landscape. The travel time from the ignition points to other cells are
computed based on the length of the respective shortest path. Using this structure, we can
simulate the spread of wildfire in a landscape.
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2.2.2

Mathematical formulation
The primary assumptions for the research problem are as follows:
1.

The ignition points of wildfires are randomly distributed across the
landscape;

2.

Multiple fires can start at any location in the landscape; however, for
simplicity, we assume that the interaction of fires is negligible;

3.

The areas outside the boundaries are unburnable;

4.

When wildfire reaches the center of a cell, that cell is assumed burned;

5.

Fire spreads in an elliptical shape within each cell.

We use FlamMap to calculate the Rate of Spread (ROS) along with the major fire
spread direction in each cell. The major fire spread direction in each cell represents the
direction in that cell for which fires spread with the fastest speed. Fires would also spread
along other directions, but at slower speed [31]. We use formulas (2.1) and (2.2) to
calculate ROS along other directions:
𝑏 2 −𝑐 2

𝑅𝑂𝑆 = 𝑏−𝑐×𝐶𝑂𝑆(𝜃)

for 0 ≤ 𝜃 <

𝑏 2 −𝑐 2

𝜋
2

𝜋

𝑅𝑂𝑆 = 𝑏+𝑐×𝐶𝑂𝑆(𝜋−𝜃) for 2 ≤ 𝜃 < 𝜋

(2.1)
(2.2)

𝜃 is the angle between the major fire spread direction in each cell computed by
FlamMap and the fire spread direction from this cell to the center of adjacent cells. In this
formula 𝑏 and 𝑐 are outputs of FlamMap and are standard parameters used to describe the
ellipse of fire spread. For more information we refer the reader to [60]. Two mixedinteger programming formulations are developed for this problem and are presented in
this section. The models use the following notations:
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Table 2.1

Notations

Sets and indices
𝑑

is the expected fire duration

𝐶
𝑁𝑖

is the set of raster cells in a landscape indexed with 𝑟, 𝑖 and 𝑗
is the set of raster cells adjacent to cell 𝑖

Parameters
distance (meters) from the center of cell 𝑖 to the center of cell 𝑗
𝐹𝑖,𝑗
rate of fire spread (meters per minute) from cell 𝑖 to cell 𝑗
𝑅𝑖,𝑗
𝐹
𝑡𝑖,𝑗
the fire spread time (minutes) from cell 𝑖 to cell 𝑗, 𝑡 = 𝑖,𝑗
𝑖,𝑗

𝐵
𝑉𝑟

is the number of ignition points
is the value of cell 𝑟 lost to the fire

𝑅𝑖,𝑗

Variables
𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 1 if the shortest path from an ignition point to cell 𝑟 passes through link
(𝑖, 𝑗); 0 otherwise
1 if a fire starts at cell 𝑗; 0 otherwise
𝑧𝑗
1 if cell 𝑟 is reached by a fire within duration 𝑑; 0 otherwise
𝑦𝑟
The objective of this model is to locate wildfire ignition points with the largest
impact on the landscape. In wildfires, it is not only how much of the landscape that is
burned and damaged that matters, but also wildfire losses. Therefore, the objective
function of the model should also compute the total damage including a monetary value
lost to fire. The model identifies the optimal locations of ignition points such that the
resulting wildfire has the maximum impact on the landscape based on the value lost. The
MIP model is as follows:
(2.3)

𝑆𝑃𝑊𝑉𝐴: max 𝑓 = ∑𝑟∈𝐶 𝑉𝑟 𝑦𝑟
1 𝑖=0
∑𝑗∈𝑁𝑖 𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 − ∑𝑗∈𝑁𝑖 𝑥𝑟,𝑗,𝑖 = { 0 𝑖 ≠ 0, 𝑟
−1 𝑖 = 𝑟
𝑥𝑟,0,𝑗 ≤ 𝑧𝑗 ∀𝑗, 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶
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∀𝑖, 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶

(2.4)
(2.5)

𝑦𝑟 ≤ ∑

𝑑

(2.6)

∀ 𝑟∈𝐶

𝑖∈𝐶,𝑗∈𝑁𝑖 𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 𝑡𝑖,𝑗

(2.7)

∑𝑗∈𝐶 𝑧𝑗 ≤ 𝐵
𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 ∈ {0,1}

(2.8)

∀ 𝑟, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 ∪ {0}

𝑦𝑟 ∈ {0,1}

∀ 𝑟∈𝐶

(2.9)

𝑧𝑗 ∈ {0,1}

∀𝑗 ∈𝐶

(2.10)

We term the model “shortest path-based wildfire vulnerability assessment” or
SPWVA. The objective function (2.3) maximizes the total loss due to wildfire within
duration 𝑑. Constraints (2.4) ensure that one unit fire flow is sent from the super source to
every cell. These constraints are called the flow conservative constraints (see [59]).
Constraints (2.5) ensure that the fire spreads to cell 𝑗 from the super source only when
cell 𝑗 is selected as an ignition point. Constraints (2.6) are the burn constraints, and set
the values of the binary variables 𝑦𝑟 . These variables are used to track whether cell 𝑟 is
reached by wildfire and, therefore, burned within duration 𝑑. If the minimum travel time
from a fire to cell r is less than or equal to the duration 𝑑, which is ∑𝑖∈𝐶,𝑗∈𝑁𝑖 𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 𝑑,
then ∑

𝑑

𝑖∈𝐶,𝑗∈𝑁𝑖 𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 𝑡𝑖,𝑗

≥ 1 and therefore 𝑦𝑟 will be equal to 1 (the objective is maximizing

on 𝑦𝑟 ). Otherwise if ∑𝑖∈𝐶,𝑗∈𝑁𝑖 𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 > 𝑑, then ∑

𝑑

𝑖∈𝐶,𝑗∈𝑁𝑖 𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 𝑡𝑖,𝑗

< 1, and therefore 𝑦𝑟 has

to be 0 as it is a binary variable. It is noteworthy that the model maximizes on 𝑦𝑟 , and,
therefore based on constraint (2.6) minimizes ∑𝑖∈𝐶,𝑗∈𝑁𝑖 𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 , which is the fire travel
time to cell r. This along with constraints (2.4) and (2.5) form a travel time minimization
problem, or the shortest path problem. Constraint (2.7) controls the number of ignition
points.
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To linearize constraints (2.6) we introduce another binary variable wr,i,j = yr ×
xr,i,j and add the following constraints to the model:
∑𝑖∈𝐶,𝑗∈𝑁𝑖 𝑤𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 𝑑
𝑤𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 𝑦𝑟
𝑤𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗

(2.12)

∀ 𝑟, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶

(2.13)

∀ 𝑟, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶

𝑤𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 ≥ 𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑦𝑟 − 1
𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 ∈ {0,1}

(2.11)

∀𝑟 ∈𝐶

(2.14)

∀ 𝑟, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶

(2.15)

∀ 𝑟, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶

Doing so would increase the size of the model, however, and would make it more
difficult to solve. An alternative way to formulate constraints (2.6) is as follows:
𝑦𝑟 ≤

𝑑−∑𝑖∈𝐶,𝑗∈𝑁 𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 𝑡𝑖,𝑗
𝑖
𝑀

(2.16)

+1 ∀𝑟 ∈𝐶

𝑀 is the length of the travel time path (𝑀 = max{∑𝑖∈𝐶,𝑗∈𝑁𝑖 𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 , ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶}).
Constraints (2.16) perform the same function as constraints (2.6) while they are
linear, and, therefore, unlike constraints (2.6), they do not require adding extra constraints
and variables for linearization. To illustrate how constraints (2.16) work, assume that the
length of the shortest path to 𝑟 is less than or equal to duration 𝑑 , which means cell 𝑟 is
considered burned, then 𝑑 − ∑(𝑖,𝑗) 𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 is non-negative, say

𝑑−∑𝑖∈𝐶,𝑗∈𝑁 𝑥𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 𝑡𝑖,𝑗
𝑖

𝑀

=𝜀>

0, thus . 𝑦𝑟 ≤ 1 + 𝜀, and 𝑦𝑟 can be 1, otherwise 𝑦𝑟 ≤ 1 − 𝜀, and 𝑦𝑟 must be 0.
The model selects the optimum potential cells for starting a fire that can reach and
burn the maximum number of cells in the landscape. In this model, the ignition points are
selected, and then, the shortest paths between the ignition points and every cell in the
network are calculated and, accordingly, the number of cells reachable by the fire within
duration 𝑑 is computed. Our preliminary tests with hypothetical landscapes, similar to
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those used in [31], reveal a drawback of SPWVA model. The model is difficult to solve
for sample instances larger than 100 cells. To overcome this problem, and solve large
landscape cases more efficiently, we develop an additional model.
2.2.3

A maximal covering location-based formulation
To overcome the difficulty of solving the shortest path problems as part of the

original problem, we develop another model based on the idea of the maximal covering
location problem [61]. This model represents the cover of wildfire in a landscape in a
given time when fire uses shortest path to spread. In this model, the shortest paths are
calculated prior to solving the model and entered into the model as input parameters. This
way we no longer require shortest path problems as part of the original problem. To
present the model, we define a new parameter, 𝐻𝑟,𝑗 , which is 1 if the length of the
shortest path from cell 𝑗 to cell 𝑟 is less than 𝑑 , and 0 otherwise. For any cell 𝑟 in the
landscape, 𝐻𝑟,𝑗 implies whether cell 𝑟 is reached within duration 𝑑 by a wildfire that
starts at cell. The model is as follows:
MCWVA: max 𝑓 = ∑𝑟∈𝐶 𝑉𝑟
𝑦𝑟 ≤ ∑𝑗∈𝐶 𝐻𝑟,𝑗 × 𝑧𝑗

∀ 𝑟∈𝐶

(2.17)
(2.18)

∑𝑗∈𝐶 𝑧𝑗 ≤ 𝐵

(2.19)

𝑦𝑟 ∈ {0,1} ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶

(2.20)

𝑧𝑗 ∈ {0,1} ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶

(2.21)

We term the model “maximal covering location-based wildfire vulnerability
assessment” or MCWVA. MCWVA uses the same variable 𝑦𝑟 as was used in SPWVA.
Since the shortest paths are already given, MCWVA has fewer variables and constraints
18

than SPWVA. In fact, SPWVA has 𝑛3 + 𝑛2 + 2𝑛 variables and 2𝑛2 + 2𝑛 + 1
constraints (𝑛 is the number of cells in the network), while MCWVA has only 2𝑛
variables and 𝑛 + 1 constraints. This is without considering variable type constraints
(2.8)-(2.10) and (2.20)-(2.21). Therefore, we expect MCWVA to be solved faster.
The objective function (2.17) maximizes the total loss of the landscape due to
wildfires. Constraints (2.18) are the burn constraints, and set the values of the binary
variables 𝑦𝑟 . Constraint (2.19) controls the number of ignition points. Constraints (2.20)
- (2.21) restrict the variables to binary values. The model can consider unburnable cells or
treated cells (e.g. cells with fuel breaks) if such data are available. These considerations
need to be made for fire behavior in each cell. For example, if cell 𝑖 is a treated cell then
this affects the fire spread time 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 from cell 𝑖 to any adjacent cell 𝑗. We can increase 𝑡𝑖,𝑗
by a constant greater than d so that it lengthens the paths that go through cell 𝑖, and,
therefore, prohibits wildfires from spreading through cell 𝑖. One can also define the
ignition probability for each cell in the landscape such that for unburnable cells or treated
cells, the corresponding ignition probability is zero. There might be parts of the landscape
that have more fire incidences, so those cells should have higher ignition probabilities.
For this reason, historical wildfire records can be used to estimate average annual wildfire
occurrence rates in each cell [28]. In the next section, we use MCWVA to investigate the
impact of wildfires with optimally located ignition points. We also compute the average
impact of wildfires over all possible ignition location scenarios. The current model can be
extended to compute the expected loss due to wildfires across a possible fire duration
distribution [62], instead of a fixed fire duration. Given the probability for each fire
duration, it can be added to the objective function.
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2.3

Model demonstration
In this section, we use MCWVA model to assess the impacts of the worst-case

scenario wildfires. A preliminary experiment using hypothetical landscapes, of sizes 7×7,
8×8 and 10×10, indicates that MCWVA can be solved efficiently. To use more realisticsized networks, we use three case studies located in the western USA, where large
wildfires are common. For these landscapes, we compare two scenarios: worst-case
wildfires with optimally located ignition points and wildfires with randomly located
ignition points. For the former, we use our MCWVA model to compute the maximum
impact of wildfires, based on their ignition locations, and for the latter we compute the
average impact of wildfires with ignition points randomly located across the landscape.
For this reason, we conduct a series of experiments to consider the impact of wildfires on
different landscapes, with different fire duration, and different wind speed scenarios. We
also run a series of experiments to compute the impact of wildfires in presence of WUI in
a landscape. These experiments are discussed in details in the following sections. Since
we use case study landscapes for experimentation (which are much larger than the
hypothetical landscapes used in the preliminary tests), we do not report the results of the
preliminary tests on the hypothetical landscapes.
We used the LANDFIRE database to obtain landscape files (LCP) for the
landscapes under study. LANDFIRE data are commonly used in wildland fire simulation
modeling, as they are standardized, and updated regularly to adjust to disturbances such
as wildfires, fuels treatment and urban development [20]. Landscape files (LCP) contain
spatial data themes such as fuel models, elevation, slope, aspect, and canopy
characteristics. We use these data as inputs of FlamMap to model fire behavior and
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spread in each cell of the landscapes. FlamMap inputs these data, along with wind speed,
wind direction, and fuel moisture conditions to compute rate of spread and the major fire
spread direction in each cell. We use the outputs of FlamMap (the rate of spread, and the
major fire spread direction in each cell) to model fire spread in the landscapes using
minimum travel time algorithm. The details of the landscape cases are discussed in the
following section.
2.3.1

Case studies
The first case is the 6307 km2 Santa Fe National Forest in northern New Mexico.

A prevailing west to east wind is assumed for this case with 300 Azimuth at 12 miles per
hour ( 19.31 km per hour). The second case is the 3979 km2 Umpqua National Forest at
the western slopes of Cascade Mountains in Oregon. The same wind condition is
assumed. The third case is the 3334 km2 San Bernardino National Forest located in the
San Bernardino Mountains in southern California. For this case a prevailing east to west
wind with 270 Azimuth at 12 miles per hour is assumed. However, we also study this
case under slower and faster wind speed conditions. Figure 2.3 Figure 2.2 shows the
approximate locations of these case study landscapes.
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Figure 2.3

Test case locations

The approximate locations of the case study landscapes in the US (retrieved from [63] )
Although modeling these cases into rasterized networks with high number of cells
makes the model more accurate, as the size of the networks increases, the model becomes
more difficult to solve. According to Minas et al [17], landscapes divided into several
hundred to a thousand management units are of practical interest for fuels management
purposes. We clip an area of 3 km×3 km from the first and second landscapes. To test the
capability of the model for a larger landscape, we clip an area of 4.2 km×4.2 km from the
third landscape and rasterize them into networks with 25×25 (625) square cells, each 120
m × 120 m wide, for the first two landscapes, and 35×35 (1225) square cells, each 120 m
× 120 m wide, for the third landscape. To quantify fire behavior on these landscapes we
use FlamMap 5.0 to calculate the rate of spread and fire spread directions.
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Table 2.2

Initial fuel moisture conditions used in FlamMap
1 hour initial moisture
10 hour initial moisture
100 hours initial moisture
Herbaceius fuel moisture
Live woody fuel moisture

6
7
8
60
90

We use the same initial fuel moisture scenarios for all three cases in our study
(Table 2.2 ). FlamMap uses GIS data, landscape characteristics, fuel moisture, and wind
conditions and outputs fire behavior for each cell. In this section, we run a set of
experiments to find the effect of the locations of ignition points on the damage that
wildfires can cause. Therefore, we compare two scenarios: (1) wildfires with random
ignition points (“random wildfires”), and (2) wildfires with optimally located ignition
points (“worst-case wildfires”). In the worst-case wildfires, the ignition locations are
selected optimally through solving MCWVA model. Figure 2.4 shows the fire foot print
after 24 hours for a sample random wildfire and the worst-case wildfire with one ignition
point for the Santa Fe landscape. The worst-case wildfire with an optimally located
ignition point has much larger impact on the landscape than the sample random wildfire
(see Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4

Fire footprint example

Fire footprint after 24 hours for the Santa Fe National Forest landscape for
(a) a sample random wildfire with single ignition point,
(b) the worst-case wildfire with single ignition point
To compare these wildfires, we conduct a series of experiments by which we also
test the effect of other parameters. In the first set of experiments we assume cells have the
same value across all the landscapes. We compute the impact of wildfires as percentages
of landscapes burned. Through these experiments, we can see the impact of wildfires on
different landscapes as well. In the second set of experiments, we only focus on the
largest landscape and test the effect of wind speed on wildfires impact. In the last set of
experiments, we assume that part of the landscape is occupied by WUI, and, therefore,
not all cells have equal value. In this experiment, we test the impact of worst-case
scenario wildfires in presence of WUI.
To calculate the impact of wildfires with optimally located ignition points, we
solve the MCWVA model for the three landscape cases. We implement the model
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formulation using Python 2.7 and solve it with Gurobi 6.0 [64]. All tests are performed
on a computer with Intel Core i5 2520M processor at 2.5 GHz and 8 GB RAM. By
solving the model to optimality, it gives us the optimal location(s) of ignition point(s) for
a wildfire with the maximum damage it can cause.
In all of the following experiments, we compare the two wildfire cases (random
wildfires and worst-case wildfires) for different number of ignition point scenarios, by
systematically increasing the number of ignition points from one to five. To calculate the
impact of random wildfires, in which the ignition points are randomly located, we
compute the average impact of wildfires, for all scenarios of ignition locations, for one
and two ignition points. However, for three and more ignition points, computing the
average impact of wildfires requires tremendous computational effort. For example, for a
three ignition point scenario, we would need to compute the average impact of wildfires
for 𝐶3625 scenarios (number of 3-combination from a set with 625 elements), which
entails more than 40 million scenarios for the first two landscapes, and more than 300
million scenarios for the third landscape (𝐶31225 ). Therefore, we use Monte Carlo
simulation for 3, 4, and 5 ignition point scenarios. We take a random sample of 5,000
possible ignition location scenarios, and after finding the average and standard deviation
of the impact of wildfires for each case, we build 95% confidence intervals for
comparison. The experiments are discussed in the following sections.
2.3.2

The impact of wildfires on different landscapes
In this section, we run a set of experiments on the three landscape case studies to

investigate the impact of two cases of wildfires, random wildfires, and worst-case
wildfires. We compute the impacts of these wildfires under three fire duration scenarios,
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12, 18 and 24 hours. For random wildfires, we compute the average impact, and the 95%
confidence intervals for 5,000 randomly selected Monte Carlo samples. We assume that
all cells are homogeneous and have equal values (𝑉𝑟 =1.. ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶). Thus, the impacts of
wildfires can be presented as the percentages of the landscape burned. Table 2.3 shows
the percentages of each landscape burned by worst-case wildfires with 𝑋 number of
ignition points (represented by WCWF(𝑋)), and the average percentages of landscapes
burned by random wildfires with 𝑋 number of ignition points (represented by RWF(𝑋)).
The 95% confidence intervals for random wildfires are presented in Table 2.4
Table 2.3

The percentages of landscape burned

24 hours

18 hours

12 hours

Fire duration Landscape name

Santa Fe
Umpqua
San Bernardino
Santa Fe
Umpqua
San Bernardino

WCWF
(1)

RWF
(1)

WCWF
(2)

RWF
(2)

WCWF
(3)

RWF
(3)

WCWF
(4)

RWF
(4)

WCWF
(5)

RWF
(5)

7.84
8.96

2.72
2.40

14.72
16.64

5.28
4.80

20.96
22.24

8.00
7.20

25.92
27.20

10.56
9.44

30.56
32.16

12.96
11.68

11.84

4.73

20.24

9.31

28.24

13.63

36.00

17.63

42.69

21.47

13.92
17.60

5.12
5.28

23.84
28.16

11.36
10.24

33.28
36.48

16.48
15.04

42.40
44.32

21.28
19.36

49.44
52.00

25.76
23.52

20.73

10.20

36.33

19.27

49.71

27.27

61.63

34.45

72.90

40.82

Santa Fe

21.12

9.92

35.84

18.88

48.32

26.88

59.20

33.92

68.80

40.00

Umpqua

25.60

9.28

38.56

17.44

50.08

24.80

60.64

31.36

69.76

36.80

31.84

17.06

55.43

30.94

76.49

87.02

42.12

51.51

93.71

59.02

17.72

17.72

7.41

29.97

14.20

40.64

20.16

49.37

25.50

56.89

San Bernardino
Average

The percentages of study landscapes burned with the worst-case wildfires with 𝑋 number
of ignition points (represented by WCWF(𝑋)), and the average percentages of landscapes
burned by random wildfires with 𝑋 number of ignition points (represented by RWF(𝑋))
for different numbers of ignition points and under different fire duration scenarios.
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Table 2.4

24 hours

18 hours

12 hours

Duration

The 95% confidence interval

Landscape name

RWF(1)

RWF(2)

RWF(3)

RWF(4)

RWF(5)

LB

UB

LB

UB

LB

UB

LB

UB

LB

UB

Santa Fe

2.61

2.83

5.23

5.33

7.94

8.06

10.49

10.63

12.88

13.04

Umpqua

2.26

2.54

4.73

4.87

7.12

7.28

9.35

9.63

11.58

11.87

San Bernardino

4.42

4.66

9.23

9.38

13.54

13.37

17.53

17.74

21.35

21.59

Santa Fe

4.90

5.34

11.26

11.46

16.36

16.60

21.15

21.41

25.63

25.89

Umpqua

5.00

5.56

10.11

10.37

14.90

15.18

19.21

19.51

23.36

23.68

San Bernardino

10.02

10.39

19.15

19.38

27.09

27.44

34.26

34.64

40.62

41.02

Santa Fe

9.57

10.27

18.72

19.04

26.71

27.05

33.74

34.10

39.81

40.19

Umpqua

8.84

9.72

17.25

17.63

24.60

25.00

31.15

31.57

36.60

37.00

San Bernardino

16.81

17.31

30.79

31.09

41.87

42.38

51.24

51.78

58.75

59.29

Average

7.16

7.63

14.05

14.28

20.01

20.30

25.35

25.66

30.06

30.39

The 95% confidence interval for percentages of landscapes burned by RWF wildfires for
different number of ignition points, and fire duration scenarios.
Table 2.5

24 hours

18 hours

12 hours

Duration

The ratios of percentages of landscapes burned
𝑊𝐶𝑊𝐹(1)
𝑅𝑊𝐹(1)

𝑊𝐶𝑊𝐹(2)
𝑅𝑊𝐹(2)

𝑊𝐶𝑊𝐹(3)
𝑅𝑊𝐹(3)

𝑊𝐶𝑊𝐹(4)
𝑅𝑊𝐹(4)

𝑊𝐶𝑊𝐹(5)
𝑅𝑊𝐹(5)

Average

Santa Fe

2.88

2.79

2.62

2.45

2.36

2.62

Umpqua

3.73

3.47

3.09

2.88

2.75

3.18

San Bernardino

2.50

2.17

2.07

2.04

1.99

2.16

Santa Fe

2.72

2.10

2.02

1.99

1.92

2.15

Umpqua

3.33

2.75

2.43

2.29

2.21

2.60

San Bernardino

2.03

1.89

1.82

1.79

1.79

1.86

Santa Fe

2.13

1.90

1.80

1.75

1.72

1.86

Umpqua

2.76

2.21

2.02

1.93

1.90

2.16

San Bernardino

1.87

1.79

1.82

1.69

1.59

1.75

Average

2.66

2.34

2.19

2.09

2.02

2.26

Landscape name

The ratios of percentages of landscapes burned with the worst-case wildfires with X
number of ignition points (represented by WCWF(X)), and the average percentages of
landscapes burned by random wildfires with X number of ignition points (represented by
RWF(X)) for different numbers of ignition points and under different fire duration
scenarios.

27

Using the confidence intervals, we can see whether there is a significant
difference between the impact of random wildfires and the worst-case wildfires on each
landscape. For the three landscape cases, the differences between the average impacts of
random wildfires (based on the number of ignition points) are statistically significant at
95% significance level (none of the computed confidence intervals overlap, see Table
2.4). For wildfires with the same number of ignition points and under the same fire
duration scenario, the differences between the impacts of the worst-case wildfires and the
average impacts of random wildfires on each landscape case are statistically significant at
95% significance level. For wildfires with the same number of ignition points, the worstcase wildfires cause more than twice the damage than random wildfires (Figure 2.5). This
difference is marked for wildfires with only one ignition point; the WCWF(1) causes
approximately three times more damage to the landscapes than RWF(1), when wildfire
last for 12 hours. When the number of ignition points increases, the difference between
the two wildfire cases decreases slightly (Figure 2.5). The worst-case wildfires over
random wildfires ratio goes from 2.66 for wildfires with one ignition point to 2.02 for
wildfires with five ignition points.
The worst-case wildfires have higher impacts on the landscapes than random
wildfires (Figure 2.5, Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8). Wildfires have different impacts on
different landscapes. The worst-case wildfires and random wildfires both have higher
impact on the San Bernardino case landscape than the other two landscape cases (Figure
2.5, Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8). Also, the difference between the impact of the worst-case
wildfires and the average impact of random wildfires is greater for the Umpqua landscape
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case than the San Bernardino landscape case (0). These differences are likely due to
landscape characteristics which impact the rate of spread and major fire spread direction.

Figure 2.5

The percentage of Santa Fe landscape burned

The percentage of Santa Fe National Forest landscape case burned with random wildfires
(represented by RWF) and the worst-case wildfires (represented by WCWF) under
different number of ignition points; in which fire lasts: (a) 12 hours, (b) 18 hours, and (c)
24 hours
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Figure 2.6

The percentage of Umpqua landscape burned

The percentage of Umpqua National Forest landscape case burned with random wildfires
(represented by RWF) and the worst-case wildfires (represented by WCWF) under
different number of ignition points; in which fire lasts: (a) 12 hours, (b) 18 hours, and (c)
24 hours
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Figure 2.7

The percentage of San Bernardino landscape burned

The percentage of San Bernardino National Forest landscape case burned with random
wildfires (represented by RWF) and the worst-case wildfires (represented by WCWF)
under different number of ignition points; in which fire lasts: (a) 12 hours, (b) 18 hours,
and (c) 24 hours
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Figure 2.8

The percentage of three landscape burned

The percentage of the three landscape cases burned with random wildfires (represented
by RWF) and the worst-case wildfires (represented by WCWF) under different number of
ignition points, and different fire duration scenario
The worst-case wildfires and random wildfires both cause more damage on
landscapes when fires last longer; however, the worst-case wildfires on average spread
faster and cause more damage over shorter times than random wildfires cause over longer
times (Figure 2.8). For example, the impact of the worst-case wildfires over 12 hours and
18 hours are respectively more than the impact of random wildfires over 18 hours and 24
hours.
2.3.3

The impact of wildfires under different wind speed scenarios
In addition to landscape characteristics, wind speed also has a major impact on

fire behavior [65]. In the previous set of experiments, we assumed the same wind speed
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conditions for all three landscape cases. In this section, we test the impact of wildfires
under three different wind speed scenarios. By doing so, we can obtain a more robust
conclusion about the effect of ignition locations on the impact of wildfires on landscapes.
For this reason, we run a set of experiments on the San Bernardino landscape case (the
largest landscape with 35 × 35 cells) to investigate the impact of wildfires under three
different wind speed scenarios: 8 , 12 and 16 mph ( 12.87 , 19.31 , 25.75 kph
respectively). As we discussed before, of the three cases, the San Bernardino case has the
least difference between worst-case wildfires and random wildfires (we pick the weakest
case for this experiment). The results show that for higher speed winds, wildfires cause
more damage; the higher the wind speed, the more damage the wildfires cause (Table 2.6
and Figure 2.9). In this experiment, under different wind speed scenarios, the worst-case
wildfires still have a greater impact on the landscape than random wildfires (Table 2.6
and Table 2.8; for 95% confidence intervals for random wildfires see Table 2.7).
Table 2.6

The impact of wind speed, the percentages burned

Fire
duration

Wind
speed

WCWF
(1)

RWF
(1)

WCWF
(2)

RWF
(2)

WCWF
(3)

RWF
(3)

WCWF
(4)

RWF
(4)

WCWF
(5)

RWF
(5)

8

11.67

3.92

20.08

7.67

26.29

11.18

32.00

14.61

37.47

17.88

12 hours

12

11.84

4.73

20.24

9.31

28.24

13.63

36.00

17.63

42.69

21.47

16

13.06

5.88

23.67

11.51

33.71

16.65

43.18

21.47

50.53

26.04

8

20.24

8.33

32.73

15.84

43.27

27.61

53.71

28.73

62.53

34.29

12

20.73

10.20

36.33

19.27

49.71

27.27

61.63

34.45

72.90

40.82

16

21.63

12.57

42.29

23.43

60.82

32.73

74.04

40.90

84.49

47.92

8

31.18

13.96

48.24

25.63

62.37

35.43

72.65

43.59

83.67

50.69

12

31.84

17.06

55.43

30.94

76.49

87.02

42.12

51.51

93.71

59.02

16

35.10

20.82

62.61

36.90

84.33

49.39

94.12

59.27

96.65

66.86

21.92

10.83

37.96

20.06

51.69

33.43

56.61

34.68

69.40

40.55

18 hours

24 hours
Average

The percentages of the San Bernardino landscape burned with the worst-case wildfires
with X number of ignition points (represented by WCWF(X)), and the average
percentages of landscapes burned by random wildfires with X number of ignition points
(represented by RWF(X)) for different numbers of ignition points and under different fire
duration and wind speed scenarios.
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Table 2.7

The impact of wind speed, the 95% confidence interval

Fire duration

12 hours

18 hours

24 hours

RWF(1)

Landscape name

LB

UB

RWF(2)
LB

UB

RWF(3)
LB

UB

RWF(4)
LB

RWF(5)

UB

LB

UB

Santa Fe

2.61

2.83

5.23

5.33

7.94

8.06

10.49

10.63

12.88

13.04

Umpqua
San Bernardino

2.26
4.42

2.54
4.66

4.73
9.23

4.87
9.38

7.12
13.54

7.28
13.37

9.35
17.53

9.63
17.74

11.58
21.35

Santa Fe

4.90

5.34

11.26

11.46

16.36

16.60

21.15

21.41

25.63

11.87
21.59
25.89

Umpqua
San Bernardino

5.00
10.02

5.56
10.39

10.11
19.15

10.37
19.38

14.90
27.09

15.18
27.44

19.21
34.26

19.51
34.64

23.36
40.62

Santa Fe

9.57

10.27

18.72

19.04

26.71

27.05

33.74

34.10

39.81

23.68
41.02
40.19

8.84
16.81
7.16

9.72
17.31
7.63

17.25
30.79
14.05

17.63
31.09
14.28

24.60
41.87
20.01

25.00
42.38
20.30

31.15
51.24
25.35

31.57
51.78
25.66

36.60
58.75
30.06

37.00
59.29
30.39

Umpqua
San Bernardino
Average

The 95% confidence interval for percentages of San Bernardino landscape burned by
RWF wildfires for different number of ignition points, and under different fire duration
and wind speed scenarios.
Table 2.8

The impact of wind speed, ratios

Duration

Wind speed

12 hours
18 hours
24 hours
Average

8
12
16
8
12
16
8
12
16

𝑊𝐶𝑊𝐹(1)
𝑅𝑊𝐹(1)
2.98
2.50
2.22
2.43
2.03
1.72
2.23
1.87
1.69
2.19

𝑊𝐶𝑊𝐹(2)
𝑅𝑊𝐹(2)
2.62
2.17
2.06
2.07
1.89
1.80
1.88
1.79
1.70
2.00

𝑊𝐶𝑊𝐹(3)
𝑅𝑊𝐹(3)
2.35
2.07
2.02
1.91
1.82
1.86
1.76
1.82
1.71
1.93

𝑊𝐶𝑊𝐹(4)
𝑅𝑊𝐹(4)
2.19
2.04
2.01
1.87
1.79
1.81
1.67
1.69
1.59
1.85

𝑊𝐶𝑊𝐹(5)
𝑅𝑊𝐹(5)
2.10
1.99
1.94
1.82
1.79
1.76
1.65
1.59
1.45
1.79

Average
2.45
2.16
2.05
2.02
1.86
1.79
1.84
1.75
1.62
1.95

The ratios of percentages of the San Bernardino landscape burned with the worst-case
wildfires with X number of ignition points (represented by WCWF(X)), and the average
percentages of landscapes burned by random wildfires with X number of ignition points
(represented by RWF(X)) for different numbers of ignition points and under different fire
duration and wind speed scenarios.
For wildfires with the same number of ignition points, and for the same fire
duration scenario, the worst-case wildfires under low wind speed condition have higher
impact on the landscape than random wildfires under higher wind speed condition
(Figure 2.9). For example, the worst-case wildfires with the 8 mph wind condition have
higher impact on the landscape than random wildfires with the 16 mph wind condition.
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For wildfires with one and two ignition points, the impact of worst-case wildfires is on
average twice the impact of random wildfires (Table 2.8). This difference decreases as
the number of ignition points and the fire duration increases.

Figure 2.9

The impact of wind speed, San Bernardino case

The percentages of the San Bernardino landscape case burned with: (a) the worst-case
wildfires, and (b) random wildfires; for different number of ignition points when
wildfires last for 24 hours.
2.3.4

The impact of wildfires in presence of wildland-urban interface
To investigate the impact of wildfires on landscapes in the presence of WUI, we

run another set of experiments on San Bernardino landscape (the largest landscape with
35 by 35 cells). In this set of experiments, we assume that about ten percent of the
landscape contains intermix WUI. In intermix WUI, as opposed to interface WUI, houses
mingle with wildland fuels [2], allowing the cells containing WUI to be ignitable points.
To address WUI losses due to wildfires, we include the value of each cell in the model.
By doing so, we can also address cases where cells have different values depending on
the vegetation type. In this experiment, WUI locations are distributed arbitrarily through
the landscape. To set a value for each cell in the corresponding network, we assume a
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non-WUI cell has a value of 0.4, the same value that Wei [31] uses for non-commercial
timber forest. As it is difficult to estimate the damage to a WUI cell, including damage to
properties and human life, we follow Wei [31] and use a value of 1.4 for cells containing
WUI (and non-commercial timber). These values are unit-less. However, the RAVAR
[66] resource evaluation method along with the real locations of WUI and vegetation
types can be used to assign a value to each cell. We assume that all wildfires burn for 24
hours. The objective of the mathematical optimization model is to locate the ignition
points of a wildfire that causes the maximum damage. Therefore, we expect the model to
locate the ignition points adjacent to cells with higher values (WUI cells), and thus the
resulting worst-case wildfire causes more damage to WUI cells than random wildfires
causes. Figure 2.10 (a) shows the value lost due to wildfires that last for 24 hours
considering different numbers of ignition points, and Figure 2.10 (b) shows the
percentage of WUI cells that are burned by the two types of wildfires, the worst-case
wildfires and random wildfires. As expected, the worst-case wildfires still have higher
impact on the landscape and pose more risk (more than two times on average) to WUI
than random wildfires (Figure 2.10 (b)).
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Figure 2.10

The impact of wildfires on WUI

(a) Value lost (unit-less) for the San Bernardino case with random wildfires (represented
by RWF) and the worst-case wildfires (represented by WCWF) for different ignition
point scenarios, (b) The percentage of WUI burnt in the San Bernardino case with
random wildfires and the worst-case wildfires for different number of ignition point
scenarios when fire last for 24 hours.
2.4

Discussion and conclusions
Wildfires can have serious and long-lasting impacts on ecological, social and

economic systems [49]. It is necessary to identify and understand these impacts, and to
develop cost effective mitigation strategies accordingly. In this paper, we studied the
vulnerability of landscapes to wildfire threats considering the impact of fire ignition
locations – the worst case scenario. We compared the impacts of wildfires with optimally
located ignition points, the worst-case wildfires, with the impacts of wildfires with
randomly located ignition points, random wildfires. We used FlamMap to model fire
behavior using landscape data, wind condition and fuel moisture data, and developed a
mixed integer programming model to find the maximum impact of wildfires and their
optimal ignition locations. Three landscape cases were used for experimentation and the
impacts of various factors such as the number and location of ignition points, fire
durations, and wind speeds were investigated. The proposed model is compact, and yet it
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can incorporate a variety of features such as the presence of fuel breaks and unburnable
cells, and fire duration distribution.
The major contribution of this work is the development of a compact model for
assessing the vulnerability of landscapes to wildfires regarding the location and number
of ignition points – the worst case scenario. The model can be used for assessing the
vulnerability of landscapes to arson-induced wildfires, for identifying high vulnerability
areas in a landscape. This is especially important for wildfire management and mitigation
planning. Thus far, no other research has attempted to provide such assessment. Our
results show that the worst-case wildfires cause more damage (more than two times on
average) to the landscapes than random wildfires. This is also true when WUI exists in
the landscape. The worst-case wildfires cause more than two times, on average, damage
to WUI lands than random wildfires. Although higher wind speed can exacerbate the
impact of wildfires [67], our study shows that even under low wind speed condition, the
worst-case wildfires have higher impact on landscapes than random wildfires would have
under high wind speed condition. The worst-case wildfires spread faster and cause more
damage in shorter period of time than random wildfires can cause in longer period of
time. Within 12 hours, a worst-case wildfire with one ignition point can cause three
times, on average, more damage to a landscape than a random wildfire with one ignition
point. This indicates the need for a faster response to the worst-case wildfires than
random wildfires would require. Thus, controlling the worst-case wildfires would require
a faster and larger initial attack than random wildfires would need.
For arson-induced wildfire cases, it is not only the location of ignition points that
can be determined, but the number of ignition points can also be determined. Therefore,
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arson-induced wildfires can have more ignition points (multiple fires) than natural
wildfires; which makes arson-induced wildfires more catastrophic and difficult to
suppress. Our results indicate that the worst-case wildfires with five ignition points
respectively cause 7 and 4 times more damage to a landscape than random wildfires with
one and two ignition points (Table 2.3). This difference can grow even larger if more
ignition points are chosen in an arson-induced wildfire, which makes arson-induced
wildfires even more catastrophic. Thus, the resources currently used for mitigating and
suppressing natural wildfires are probably insufficient for controlling a potential arsoninduced wildfire.
As illustrated in this research, the worst-case wildfires have different impacts on
different landscapes. This is likely due to differences in landscapes and vegetation
characteristics that influence rate of spread, and major fire spread direction; which makes
a landscape more vulnerable to arson-induced wildfires. Therefore, our model can be
used to assess the vulnerability of a particular landscape to these wildfires. The model
can identify high priority areas for wildfire risk mitigation planning such as fuels
treatment scheduling and fire suppression preparedness planning to reduce the spread and
intensity of the potential worst-case wildfires. Kim and Bettinger [68] illustrated that a
fuels management program across a broad landscape may have limited impact on humancaused wildfires. We suspect this is also true for arson-induced wildfires. In a fuels
management program planned for mitigating arson-induced wildfires, the high priority
areas should be prioritized for fuels treatments. This can reduce the vulnerability of
landscapes, and mitigate the impact of these wildfires. The same prioritization is also
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suggested for suppression preparedness planning. However, a more extensive analysis
may be required for investigating the merits of these plans.
There can be extensions to this research for future studies that are not addressed in
this paper. We investigated the impact of wildfires based on how long they last before
suppressed; assuming that the suppression efforts can successfully control wildfires. One
might investigate the impact of wildfires while also taking fire response into account,
knowing how many resources and fire-response crews are available at various points in
the landscape. This can be especially helpful in assessing the risk of arson attacks in
which adversaries are aware of fire response resources and their locations, so that they
can plan accordingly. This research can be further extended to study the mitigation of
potential arson attacks with fuels management. Although prioritizing high vulnerable
areas of a landscape for fuels management is suggested, it is not the optimal approach.
Since the fuels management program is visible to arsonists, they can act accordingly by
attacking other vulnerable areas. In that case, a network interdiction approach [69] might
be more effective. Another extension to this work is to consider the interaction effects of
multiple fires, which have been assumed negligible in this research. Fire behavior and
characteristics can dramatically change in the presence of another fire [70], and,
therefore, they can cause more damage than it is shown in this research. Therefore, one
can also take the fire interaction effects into account. We also did not include spot fires in
this study; they can increase wildfires risks by helping them spread faster [71]. For more
accurate assessment, a study can include spot fires into account as well.
In this research we have developed a mathematical programming model to the
combinatorially complex problem of landscape vulnerability assessments to arson40

induced wildfires (worst-case wildfires). Our hope is that this study can fill the gap in the
literature, and assist landscape and wildfire managers in developing a fire management
system resilient to potential arson-induced wildfire threats.
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CHAPTER III
MITIGATING A PYRO-TERROR ATTACK USING FUEL MANAGEMENT
3.1

Introduction
In this paper, we study the mitigation of a potential pyro-terror attack using fuel

management. Fuel management is used to reduce the flammability of a landscape and
decrease the risk of wildfires. Wildfire managers use fuel management to reduce the
spread rate and intensity of wildfires and therefore mitigate their impacts. Our goal is to
plan a fuel management on a landscape that minimizes the impact of a possible pyroterror attack.
To reduce the flammability of a landscape and decrease the risk of wildfires, fire
managers use fuel management programs. Fuel management is the process of altering the
amount and structure of fuel through the construction of fuel breaks or applications of
fuel treatments such as prescribed burning, commercial harvesting and mechanical
thinning, to reduce the spread and intensity of wildfires before they occur.
Over the last ten years, there has been an average of 75,000 wildfires per year and
an average of 7.2 million acres have burned in the U.S. [1]. The U.S. Forest Service
spends billions of dollars annually for wildfire suppression [2]. Moreover, wildfires also
incur tremendous environmental and socioeconomic costs as well as the loss of human
life. In particular, destructive wildfires become a primary concern in places where major
cities are located close to highly flammable vegetation areas such as in the western and
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southern U.S. along with Australia and Mediterranean Europe [3]. Due to the significant
short- and long-term threats of wildfires to forest ecosystems, and due to public safety
and property concerns, wildfires have been receiving increased public attention [72].
Wildfires can be categorized into two general categories: natural wildfires, and
arson-induced wildfires. Although arson-induced wildfires (which are mostly
unintentional) occur more often than natural wildfires, natural wildfires are more likely to
escape containment and become severe [34]. The destructive power of wildfires makes
them a viable option for adversaries as in pyro-terrorism. Pyro-terrorism is the use of
large-scale arson attacks by non-state organizations to terrorize, intimidate or coerce a
government or the civilian population in order to advance political or social objectives
[13]. According to [12], pyro-terrorism possesses the four generally accepted elements of
terrorism: targeting of noncombatants, political motivation, violence with psychological
impact, and organized perpetrators. Previous studies of pyro-terrorism have demonstrated
that it is a realistic threat [11,12,14]. Pyro-terrorism events have been documented in
France, Spain, and Greece [11,12]. As a result, both the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) are concerned about this
novel threat [15,16]. It is important for decision makers in these government agencies to
anticipate potential threats and implement countermeasures to avoid a potentially
devastating domestic attack. However, no previous study has investigated how to
mitigate the threat of pyro-terrorism. In this study we investigate how to mitigate pyroterrorism using fuel treatment, a popular approach for mitigating natural wildfires.
Wildfire incidences require the co-occurrence of three factors: fire-conduciveweather, a source of ignition, and fuel (i.e. flammable vegetation) [17]. In pyro-terrorism,
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the arsonist(s) can facilitate this process by providing a source of ignition; the location,
time, and quantity of fires are decisions for the arsonist(s) to make. Because of this ability
to optimally choose wildfire conditions, pyro-terrorism can be a more destructive threat
than natural wildfires. Rashidi et al. [45] conducted a vulnerability assessment of
landscapes to the worst-case wildfires, finding that a pyro-terror attack with a single fire
could be twice as destructive as natural wildfire.
Fuel, weather conditions and topography of a landscape are the three factors that
influence fire behavior, and fuel is the only factor that can be managed in the short run
[10]. To reduce the flammability of a landscape and decrease the risk of wildfires, fire
managers use fuel management programs. Fuel management is the process of altering the
amount and structure of fuel through the construction of fuel breaks or applications of
fuel treatments such as prescribed burning, commercial harvesting and mechanical
thinning, to reduce the spread and intensity of wildfires before they occur [23,24].
Modeling methods have been used to design efficient fuel management programs over a
landscape. Researchers have used heuristic methods [25–28,53] and optimization models
such as mixed integer programming [3,29–31], and stochastic dynamic programming
[32,33] for spatial allocation of fuel management over a landscape. However, all of these
fuel management models have been developed for reducing the spread and resulting
impact of natural wildfires. Thus, more understanding is needed of how effective fuel
management is at mitigating pyro-terror attacks and worst-case wildfires.
Although there is a rich literature on using fuel management programs to mitigate
natural wildfires, no previous study has investigated mitigation of the worst-case
wildfires. Human-caused wildfires account for a large majority of all wildfire incidences.
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In the Mediterranean region and in Southern California, human-caused wildfires account
for more than 95% of all fires [73–75]. A study in Spain found that more than 71% of all
wildfires are caused by people [76]. Of those human-caused wildfires, only 22.5% (16%
of all wildfires) were due to negligence while 77.5% (55% of all wildfires) were
intentional [76]. Pyro-terrorism can be considered a worst-case arson-induced wildfire.
Some studies have shown that arson-induced wildfires cannot be mitigated effectively
with fuel management programs designed for mitigating natural wildfires [27]. In this
paper, we investigate the mitigation of pyro-terrorism using a constrained fuel
management program.
In this paper, we use a network interdiction model for planning a fuel
management program that mitigates the impact of a single-ignition-point pyro-terror
attack. However, the results of this study can also be used for worst-case wildfires
regardless of the cause of the wildfire. In the worst-case wildfire the ignition points are
placed at the worst possible locations in a landscape such that it results in a wildfire that
causes the maximum damage to the landscape. We model a natural landscape as a grid
network and model the spread of fire in the landscape as a network optimization problem.
We assume that fire uses paths with the minimum travel time (i.e. shortest path) to spread
through the network. For this reason, we use the minimum travel time algorithm (MTT)
to model fire growth in the landscape [77]. MTT has also been used in wildfire
simulation models such as FlamMap [56], FsPro [78], and FSim [79]. When a wildfire
starts in a cell in the network, it uses its adjacent cell to spread through the network and
reach other cells. Therefore, the spread of wildfire in the network within a given time
limit (for example d hours) can be modeled as a one-to-all shortest path problem. For any
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given cell in the network, if the length of the shortest path from the fire ignition point to
that cell is less than d, then we assume that the cell can be reached and burned by the fire.
This process can equivalently be viewed as computing the “cover” of a wildfire given
that fire uses the shortest paths to spread. This methodology gives a basis for interdicting
the spread of fire in the network through interdicting the wildfire spread paths (i.e.
shortest paths) using fuel management. Given that we know the location of fire ignition
and that we are constrained on the number of interdictions (b is the maximum number of
cells that we can interdict), the problem becomes identifying b cells to interdict in order
to minimize the number of cells that will be reached (burned) by the fire.
Network interdiction models are network-based bilevel optimization programs in
which the objective of the upper level model is to impair the objective of the lower level
model. Wollmer (1964), McMasters and Mustin (1970), and Ghareh et al. (1971) were
the earliest to study network interdiction. Network interdiction has received extensive
attention in literature because of its utility in modeling practical applications in homeland
security problems such as delaying an adversary’s development of a first nuclear weapon
[82], securing a border against smuggling nuclear material [83–85], drug enforcement
optimization [86]; and other applications such as electrical grid analysis [87–90],
preventing hospital infections [91], conflict resolution [92], multicommodity flow
networks [93,94], and optimizing the placement of stationary monitors [95].
One of the classic examples of network interdiction is interdicting the shortest
path between a source node and a sink node [96,97]. A discrete version of this problem in
which the interdicted arcs are removed from the network is called the k-most-vital-arcs
problem [98–100]. In the k-most-vital-arcs problem, the objective is to identify a fixed
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number of arcs that, if removed, would cause the largest increase in the length of the
shortest path between two specified nodes. Israeli and Wood [101] considered a
generalization of the k-most-vital-arcs problem. Maximizing the shortest path through
interdicting nodes also has been studied [99,102]. In all of these cases, the objective is to
maximize the length of the shortest path between two given nodes. In our case, however,
the objective is to identify a fixed number of nodes (considering a limited budget for
interdiction) that, if interdicted, would delay the spread of fire and minimize the number
of nodes that can be reached by fire within a given time. This problem is similar to the 𝑟interdiction covering problem which was studied by Church et al. [103]. However, in
their problem they only considered interdiction of source nodes (i.e. facilities), not the
intermediate nodes that build paths through which demands are met. In this research,
however, we also consider the interdiction of intermediate nodes.
The pyro-terrorism mitigation problem can be interpreted as identifying the bmost-vital-nodes (b is the budget for interdiction) in a one-to-all shortest path problem
whose interdiction would minimize the number of nodes reachable from the source node
within a critical time limit (i.e. nodes whose shortest path’s length from the source node
is within a critical value - suppression time d). Based on this idea, we develop a network
interdiction model for mitigating a pyro-terror attack using fuel management. The model
is considered as a Stackelberg leader-follower game [104] in which fire managers, acting
first, identify optimal locations for fuel management (with the limited budget b), and
terrorists, acting second with complete information of the fuel management locations,
identify the optimal ignition point for a pyro-terror attack to inflict the maximum damage.
Assuming that in d hours the adversary-ignited fire can be suppressed, the goal of the fire
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managers is to delay the spread of fire by spatially allocating fuel management, with
limited budget b (number of treated cells), across the landscape to delay the spread of the
fire and minimize damage caused by the fire (the number of cells burned in d hours). This
work is the first attempt to develop a model for mitigating pyro-terrorism using fuel
management. The major contribution of this work is developing a computational method
for optimizing the spatial allocation of fuel management for mitigating a pyro-terror
attack. Since the model is a min-max model in which the inner level is a mixed-integer
programming model, the model cannot be directly solved using any commercial solver;
therefore, we utilize a decomposition algorithm to solve the model. The proposed
decomposition algorithm alternates between a master problem for fuel managers and a
sub problem for pyro-terrorists. The master problem identifies an optimal interdiction
strategy for a fixed pyro-terror attack (a known attack). The sub problem chooses an
optimal pyro-terror attack that identifies the ignition point of an attack given a fuel
management program. The algorithm iteratively solves the two problems generating
lower bounds and upper bounds for the problem, until the two bounds converge.
3.2

Pyro-terrorism mitigation problem (PTMP)
The pyro-terrorism mitigation problem is as follows. Wildfire managers choose a

fuel treatment plan 𝑯 (a spatial allocation of fuel treatment) that will mitigate the impact
of a potential pyro-terror attack on the landscape. Specifically, if a landscape area is
treated, fire cannot spread through that area. Next, the adversary, having seen the fuel
treatment applied by the wildfire managers, chooses a pyro-terror attack 𝑭 by selecting
the most vulnerable area in the landscape to start a fire at a single ignition point in order
to maximize the total value of acreage burned by the fire.
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In this section we develop a bi-level integer program for PTMP. In our model
both the wildfire managers’ problem and the adversary’s problem problems are modeled
as network optimization problems. We also model fire behavior in a landscape as a
shortest path problem through a composite network formed by the landscape
characteristics.
3.2.1

Modeling a landscape as a raster cell
We consider a landscape divided into a number of raster cells representing

potential fire ignition locations and candidate locations for fuel management (Figure 3.1),
and we use FlamMap [56], a fire behavior mapping and analysis program, to model the
rate of fire spread in each cell. FlamMap uses Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
data, landscape characteristics, fuel moisture, and wind conditions and computes the rate
of spread (ROS) and the major fire spread direction for each cell. These data are then
used to model fire spread behavior in each cell. The major fire spread direction in each
cell is the direction of the fastest fire spread for that cell. In reality, fire would also spread
along other directions but at a slower speed [31]. We use equations (3.1) and (3.2) to
calculate ROS along the other directions.

Figure 3.1

A landscape modeled as a 10 by 10 raster cell.
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𝑅𝑞,𝑟 = 𝑏−𝑐×𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 , 0 ≤ 𝜃 < 2 , 𝑞 ∈ 𝐶, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑁𝑞
𝑏 2 −𝑐 2

𝑅𝑞,𝑟 = 𝑏+𝑐×𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝜋−𝜃) ,

𝜋
2

≤ 𝜃 < 𝜋, 𝑞 ∈ 𝐶, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑁𝑞

(3.1)
(3.2)

𝜃 is the angle between the major fire spread direction in cell 𝑞, computed by
FlamMap, and the fire spread direction from cell 𝑞 to the center of the adjacent cell 𝑟.
The values of b and c are outputs of FlamMap and are standard parameters used to
describe the ellipse of fire spread. For a more detailed description, we refer the reader to
Green et al. [60].
3.2.2

Problem description and model formulation
In our model the adversary has complete knowledge about weather and the

topography of the landscape. They also are aware of the location of all treated cells.
Having this complete knowledge, they identify an optimal ignition point in the landscape
to ignite a fire with maximum total damage in terms of the value of landscape burned.
The wildfire managers act before the adversary and take a proactive approach, identifying
the optimal locations for fuel treatment. The wildfire manager’s objective is to minimize
the total damage of an attack in terms of the value of landscape burned; thus, the twoplayer game is symmetric. In our model the wildfire manager seeks to mitigate against
the attack with the worst possible damage. Thus, the optimal objective value returned by
our model is a lower bound on the case in which the adversary does not have complete
knowledge.
The damage of a pyro-terror attack can be evaluated as a percent of the landscape
burned or the value lost to fire (such as value of vegetation depending on the type, e.g.
commercial timber) and the value of wild-land urban interface (WUI) lost. In this
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research, we measure the damage as the percent of the landscape burned. However, our
model can also be directly used for cases in which landscape areas have different values.
The primary assumptions of this research are the following: (1) Fire travels using
paths with the minimum travel time to spread through the landscape. (2) When a fire
reaches the center of a cell, that cell is completely burned. (3) If fuel treatment is
conducted in a cell, it delays the fire from spreading to the adjacent cells; however, it will
not prevent this cell from burning. (4) We only focus on the landscape, and ignore the
effect of fire on the areas outside the boundary. (5) The fire managers are able to suppress
the fire in 24 hours. (6) The pyro-terrorist only starts a wildfire in one cell.
Although a multiple-ignition-point pyro-terror attack is more destructive than a
single-ignition-point pyro-terrorism event [45], in this paper we assume the adversary
conducts single-ignition-point attack. The single-ignition-point pyro-terror attack is a
reasonable assumption due to the fact that although the adversary wants to maximize the
damage of his attack, he or she also may wish to avoid detection. Starting multiple manmade fires (i.e. using a multiple-ignition-point pyro-terror attack) increases the likelihood
of being seen by authorities or civilians.
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The notations used in the model are as follows:
Table 3.1

Notations

Sets and indices
is the set of raster cells in a landscape indexed with 𝑟, 𝑖 and 𝑗
𝐶
is the set of raster cells adjacent to cell 𝑞
𝑁𝑞
Parameters
the fire spread time from cell 𝑖 to cell 𝑗
𝜏𝑖,𝑗
value of cell 𝑟
𝑣𝑟
a big number which is bigger than the largest shortest travel time path
𝑀
from any point to any other point in the landscape
the distance between cells 𝑟 and 𝑞
∆𝑞,𝑟
the rate of spread from 𝑞 to 𝑟
𝑅𝑞,𝑟
the delay in fire spread time in a cell caused by treating the cell
Γ
the fuel management budget
𝑏
the duration of pyro-terrorism wildfire
𝑑
Variables
𝑋𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 1 if the shortest path for fire passes from cell 𝑖 to cell 𝑗 to reach cell 𝑟,
0 otherwise (vector 𝑿)
1 if the adversary ignites a fire at cell 𝑗, otherwise 0 (vector 𝑭 is the
𝐹𝑗
pyro-terror attack)
1 if cell 𝑗 is treated, otherwise 0 (vector 𝑯 is the fuel management
𝐻𝑗
program used as an mitigation plan)
the fire arrival time for cell 𝑟 when fire has started from cell 𝑠
𝑇𝑠,𝑟
1 if fire reaches cell 𝑟, otherwise 0 (vector 𝒀)
𝑌𝑟
1 if fire that is ignited at cell s reaches cell 𝑟, otherwise 0 (vector 𝒀)
𝑌𝑠,𝑟

The mathematical formulation for the pyro-terrorism mitigation problem (PTMP)
is as follows:
𝑃𝑇𝑀𝑃: 𝑍 ∗ = min𝑯∈Ω (𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑿,𝑭)∈Ψ(𝑯) ∑𝑟 𝑣𝑟 𝑌𝑟 )

(3.3)

Where the set Ω is defined as the set of all 𝑯 such that
∑𝑖 𝐻𝑖 ≤ 𝑏

(3.4)

𝐻 ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶

(3.5)
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and the set Ψ(𝑯) is defined by
1
∑𝑗∈𝑁𝑖 𝑋𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 − ∑𝑗∈𝑁𝑖 𝑋𝑟,𝑗,𝑖 = { 0
−1

𝑌𝑟 ≤

𝑖 = 0, …
𝑖 ≠ 0, 𝑟
𝑖 = 𝑟….

(3.6)

∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 ∪ {0}

𝑋𝑟,0,𝑗 ≤ 𝐹𝑗 ∀ 𝑟, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶

(3.7)

∑𝑗∈𝐶 𝐹𝑗 ≤ 1

(3.8)

𝑑−∑(𝑖,𝑗)(𝜏𝑖,𝑗 + 𝐻𝑖 Γ)𝑋𝑟,𝑖,𝑗
𝑀

(3.9)

+1 ∀𝑟 ∈𝐶

𝑌𝑖 ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶

(3.10)

𝑋𝑟,𝑗,𝑖 ∈ [0, 1], ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶, 𝑗, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 ∪ {0}

(3.11)

𝐹𝑗 ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶

(3.12)

This is a bilevel optimization model with fire managers’ problem in the upper
level, and the adversary’s problem in the lower level. The objective function (3.3)
represents the fire managers’ desire to choose a fuel management program 𝑯 (i.e., a
mitigation plan) which limits the fire spread and thereby minimizes the damage caused
by the pyro-terror attack; simultaneously, it also represents the adversary’s desire to
maximize the damage of a pyro-terror attack by choosing the optimal ignition point of
fire in the landscape. The fire managers’ mitigation plan is restricted by constraints (3.4)
and (3.5). Constraint (3.4) is the restriction on the budget for fuel management; it is the
number of cells to which fuel management can be applied.
For any specific fuel management program 𝑯 chosen by the wildfire managers
(𝑯 should be viewed as data when viewing the adversary’s problem) the adversary’s
pyro-terror plan is restricted to set Ψ(𝑯), as defined by constraints (3.6) through (3.12).
In addition to choosing the optimal ignition location, the lower level problem identifies
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paths with the minimum travel time for modeling fire spread in the landscape. The model
contains the one-to-all shortest path formulation. Since the starting point of fire is
unknown, we use a dummy super source (cell 0) to represent the starting point of fire.
The super source is a hypothetical cell and is connected to every cell in the landscape,
with zero travel time. For any target cell (a potential cell for the wildfire to reach and
burn) in the landscape, one unit fire flow is sent from the super source through the
ignition point (cell i) and from there to the target cell, using the shortest path (Figure 3.2)
The set of flow conservative constraints in (3.6) requires that one unit of fire flow
is sent from the super source to any cell 𝑟. The set of constraints (3.7) ensures that the fire
spreads to cell 𝑗 from the super source only when cell 𝑗 is selected as the ignition point by
the adversary. Constraint (3.8) enforces the assumption that the adversary only starts a
wildfire in one cell. The constraints presented in the equation (3.9) are the burn
constraints and set the values of the binary variables 𝑌𝑟 . These variables are used to track
whether the fire reaches cell 𝑟 and therefore burned within duration 𝑑. Also, the
mitigation impact of fuel management is implemented in constraints (3.9). For example,
if fuel management is conducted in cell 𝑖 ( 𝐻𝑖 = 1), through these constraints the fire
travel time from cell 𝑖 to each adjacent cell 𝑗 increases by Γ. Constraints (3.9) resembles
the node-interdiction version of the shortest path network interdiction problem [101].
Fire managers aim to interdict fire growth by lengthening fire travel time,
assuming that fire travels along paths with the minimum travel time (i.e., the shortest
path) [58]. Constraints (3.6) through (3.9) form a one-to-all shortest path problem and are
used to identify paths with the minimum travel time.
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Figure 3.2

Modeling fire spread using shortest paths

A dummy super source (cell 0) is connected to each cell with 0 travel time: (a) A wildfire
would start at cell 0; (b) would set fire on the ignition point at time 0 and from there
would spread through the landscape using shortest paths.
3.3

A solution approach
The pyro-terrorism mitigation problem (PTMP) has a bilevel “min-max” structure

with a mixed integer programming (MIP) problem as the lower level; thus, the lower
level problem is not guaranteed a nonzero duality gap. Therefore, the problem does not
readily lend itself to the common approach of taking the dual of the inner problem,
resulting in a single-level minimization problem. In this section, we present a
decomposition algorithm, called Min-Max Decomposition Algorithm (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐷𝐴), to
solve 𝑃𝑇𝑀𝑃. 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐷𝐴, like the decomposition algorithm proposed by Brown et al.
[82] alternates between (𝑖) a master problem, where the wildfire managers identify an
optimal mitigation strategy through a fuel management program for a fixed pyro-terror
attack with the starting point of the fire being known, and (𝑖𝑖) a sub problem, where the
pyro-terrorist (adversary) identifies an optimal pyro-terror attack to start the fire for a
fixed fuel management program. In 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐷𝐴, unlike the standard Benders
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decomposition algorithm, the sub problem is a MIP, not a linear program, and it is not
totally unimodular to be relaxed.
The sub problem and master problem of our decomposition algorithm are
discussed in the following sections. To present the algorithm we first need to introduce
new notations:
Table 3.2

Additional notations

Sets and indices
𝜙
Ω
Ψ(. )

3.3.1

the set of pyro-terror attack plans (cells considered to start a pyro-terror
wildfire) used in the decomposition algorithm
the set of feasible solutions for the upper level problem (the fire
managers’ problem)
the set of feasible solutions for the lower level problem (the pyroterrorist’s problem)

The pyro-terrorists’ problem (PTP) for a known fuel management
program
̂ ∈ Ω, we denote the resulting pyroFor a fixed fuel management program 𝑯

̂ ):
terrorism model for the adversary as 𝑃𝑇𝑃(𝑯
̂ ): 𝑍𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑯
̂ ) = max ∑𝑟 𝑣𝑟 𝑌𝑟
PTP(𝑯

(3.13)

With constraints (3.6) through (3.12), in which the variable 𝐻𝑗 is replaced with
̂𝑗 ∈ 𝑯
̂ for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶 (i.e. the locations of the cells that underwent fuel management is
𝐻
known to the adversary)
The PTP model presented above selects the optimum potential cell to start a fire
that can cause the maximum damage to the landscape given an observed fuel
̂ . For any potential ignition point, the model computes the
management program 𝑯
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number of cells that the fire is able to reach (using the paths with minimum travel time)
within duration 𝑑 and selects the ignition point that, if fire starts from that cell, causes the
maximum damage to the landscape. A major computation burden of this problem is
calculating the minimum travel time paths (shortest paths) for any potential ignition
̂ , if the shortest paths were known, the
point. For a given fuel management program 𝑯
problem would be equivalent to a maximal covering location problem [61]. For example,
̂ ) is 1 if the length of the shortest path from cell j to cell r is less than or equal
say 𝐿𝑗,𝑟 (𝑯
to d, and 0 otherwise. This implies whether the fire ignited at cell j can reach (cover) cell
r within duration d. The equivalent maximal covering-based pyro-terrorism model
(MCPTP) is as follows:
̂ ) = max ∑𝑟 𝑣𝑟 𝑌𝑟
̂ ): 𝑍𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑯
MCPTP(𝑯
̂ )𝐹𝑗
𝑌𝑟 ≤ ∑𝑗∈𝐶 𝐿𝑗,𝑟 (𝑯

∀𝑟 ∈𝐶

∑𝑗∈𝐶 𝐹𝑗 ≤ 1

(3.14)
(3.15)
(3.16)

𝑌𝑟 ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶

(3.17)

𝐹𝑗 ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶

(3.18)

̂ ) is a smaller model than PTP(𝐇
̂ ) in that it has fewer variables and
MCPTP(𝐇
̂ ) has 𝑛3 + 𝑛2 + 2𝑛 variables and 2𝑛2 + 2𝑛 + 1 constraints (𝑛
constraints. In fact, PTP(𝐇
is the number of cells in the network), without considering sign restriction constraints
̂ ) on other hand has only 2𝑛 variables and 𝑛 + 1
(3.10) through (3.12). MCPTP(𝐇
constraints without sign restriction constraints (3.17) through (3.18). Our preliminary
̂ ) can be solved faster than PTP(𝐇
̂ ).
experiments verify that MCPTP(𝐇
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̂ ), we first compute 𝐿𝑗,𝑟 (𝑯
̂ ) for ∀ 𝑗, 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶. The mitigation
To solve MCPTP(𝐇
̂ is imposed in calculating 𝐿𝑗,𝑟 (𝑯
̂ ). For this
effect of a fuel management program 𝑯
reason, we assume that treated cells can block the spread of fire (treated cells are
impassable); therefore the fire cannot use any treated cell to spread through the
landscape. To compute 𝑃𝑗,𝑟(𝑯̂) , we independently solve the all-to-all shortest paths
problem, and compute 𝑇𝑗,𝑟 (the fire arrival time to cell 𝑟 when fire has started from cell 𝑗)
for all cells in the network. If a cell is treated, the time required for the fire to spread
through this cell will be given a value larger than 𝑑; therefore, the fire cannot spread out
̂ ) renders the
of this cell to any adjacent cell within duration 𝑑. Solving MCPTP(𝐇
̂.
ignition point of the optimal pyro-terror attack for the given fuel management program 𝑯
Knowing the adversary’s problem for a specific fuel management program, as
shown above, the pyro-terrorism mitigation problem 𝑃𝑇𝑀𝑃 is equivalent to:
𝑍 ∗ = min 𝑍𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑯)

𝑯∈Ω

(3.19)

Theoretically, we could solve (3.19) by enumerating the finite set of fuel
̂ ∈ Ω, solving MCPTP(𝐇
̂ ) for each plan, and choosing the
management mitigation plans 𝑯
̂ ). However, in reality, Ω is too large to
plan that results in the least value of 𝑍𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑯
enumerate. For a landscape rasterized into a 100 cells network and for a 10% fuel
100
management budget, there are 𝐶10
≅ 1.73 × 1013 fuel management programs.

Therefore, we solve (3.19) with the decomposition algorithm described below.
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3.3.2

Optimal mitigation of a known pyro-terror attack using fuel management
program
To solve PTMP we use a procedure that computes a lower bound on the objective

value (the effect of an optimal fuel management on controlling fire growth). This lower
bound is an optimistic value of how much the wildfire managers can reduce the damage
caused by fire by interdicting the fire growth with a fuel management program. For this
reason, we formulate an optimization model denoted by IPMin (𝐅̂) that can determine an
optimal mitigation of any fixed pyro-terror attack plan (𝐅̂) using an optimal fuel
management program. A solution to this model is a lower bound to 𝑃𝑇𝑀𝑃 because the
adversary’s plan is restricted to (𝐅̂). This model is adopted from [31].
̂ ) ≡ min𝑯∈Ω 𝑍
IPMin: 𝑍min (𝑭
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑍 ≥ ∑𝑟 𝑣𝑟 𝑌𝑠,𝑟
𝑇𝑠,𝑠 = 0
∆𝑞,𝑟

𝑇𝑠,𝑟 ≤ 𝑇𝑠,𝑞 + 𝑅

𝑞,𝑟

𝑌𝑠,𝑟 ≥

𝑑

∀ 𝑠∈𝜙

+ Γ𝐻𝑞

𝑑−𝑇𝑠,𝑟

∀ 𝑠∈𝜙

∀ 𝑟, 𝑞 ∈ 𝐶, 𝑠 ∈ 𝜙

∀𝑠 ∈ 𝜙, 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶

∑𝑟 𝐻𝑟 ≤ 𝑏

(3.20)
(3.21)
(3.22)
(3.23)
(3.24)
(3.25)

𝑇𝑠,𝑟 = the fire arrival time from the ignition point 𝑠 to cell 𝑟
In this model 𝜙 is the set of ignition points of the optimal pyro-terror attacks
found up to the current point in the algorithm’s progression. For the given pyro-terror
attack 𝐹̂ , if 𝑠̂ is the index of the ignition point in 𝐹̂ (𝑠̂ = {𝑠 ∈ 𝐶 |𝐹̂𝑠 = 1}), we add 𝑠̂ to 𝜙.
The objective function (3.20) represents the loss caused by fire and is denoted by a new
variable 𝑍 and is bounded in constraint (3.21). Constraints (3.22) set the fire arrival time
59

of cell 𝑠 to zero when cell 𝑠 has been chosen by the adversary (pyro-terrorist) as the
ignition point. Constraints (3.23) apply the minimum travel time algorithm to track the
earliest time that the fire can reach cell 𝑟 from any of its adjacent cells when the fire starts
from cell 𝑠; this is where the fuel management based interdiction strategy can be imposed
to mitigate the damage of fire by delaying the fire’s growth. This formulation also
resembles a node-based shortest path network interdiction problem; it is used to delay fire
growth by means of the treated cells. The amount of time delay is defined by a parameter
Γ. If Γ is set to a value larger than the maximum fire duration, then constraint (3.23)
implies that fuel management can block the fire from spreading out of the treated cells.
Constraints (3.24) track whether fire has reached cell 𝑟 within duration 𝑑. If the
fire can reach the center of a cell within duration 𝑑 (𝑇𝑠,𝑟 ≤ 𝑑) then that cell is considered
burned or lost and the binary variable 𝑌𝑠,𝑟 is set to 1. The model is minimizing the amount
of loss due to the fire represented by 𝑌𝑠,𝑟 variables, and, therefore, through constraints
(3.24), it maximizes the fire arrival time (calculated with the MTT algorithm) by
allocating fuel management resources in the landscape (through 𝐻𝑞 in constraints (3.23)).
Constraint (3.25) is the budget constraint restricting the number of fuel management cells
due to limited resources.
3.3.3

Decomposition algorithm: MinMaxDA
We define a set of pyro-terror attacks 𝜙. At iteration 𝑘 of 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐷𝐴, a pyro-

̂𝑘 (𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾), will have been generated from the sub problem which
terror attack 𝐹
identifies an optimal ignition point. The set of pyro-terror attacks 𝜙 𝑘 is updated by
̂𝑘 = 1}). Then the master
̂𝑘 (𝑠̂𝑘 = {𝑠 ∈ 𝐶 |𝐹
adding the index of the newly found attack 𝐹
𝑠
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problem IPMin is updated to include new constraints and variables associated with the
̂𝑘 . In particular, constraint (3.21) is replaced with constraints
newly found ignition plan 𝐹
(3.26) to impose a lower bound on the fire loss due to the fire that is generated by all
̂𝑘 . Also, constraints (3.22) − (3.24) are
pyro-terror attacks found so far, including 𝐹
̂𝑘 = 1}).
updated to include the newly found ignition point (𝑠̂𝑘 = {𝑠 ∈ 𝐶 |𝐹
𝑠
𝑍 ≥ ∑𝑟 𝑣𝑟 𝑌𝑠,𝑟

∀ 𝑠 ∈ 𝜙𝑘

(3.26)

Constraints (3.26) are analogous to Benders cuts. Let’s call the master problem at
iteration 𝑘 that contains these cuts 𝐼𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑘 .
3.3.3.1

Theorem 1
The optimal objective value for 𝐼𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑘 provides a valid lower bound for 𝑍 ∗ .
This is true because 𝐼𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑘 determines an optimal mitigation plan for any fixed

pyro-terror attack limited to 𝜙 𝑘 while 𝑍 ∗ in PTMP (equation (3.3)) considers all possible
pyro-terror attacks. This is similar to solving 𝑍 ∗ for 𝑯 ∈ Ω when Ψ(𝑯) (the lower level
problem) is restricted on the set of potential ignition points. ∎
3.3.3.2

Theorem 2: 𝑍 𝑘+1 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≥ 𝑍 𝑘 𝑚𝑖𝑛 .
Since 𝜙 𝑘 ⊆ 𝜙 𝑘+1 , therefore, 𝐼𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑘+1 is more restricted than 𝐼𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑘 . ∎
The lower bound from 𝐼𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑘 converges to Z ∗ . Since the lower bound is non-

decreasing (theorem 2), if the solution of the master problem does not repeat, 𝐼𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑘
converges to Z ∗ . We use the solution elimination constraints (3.27) [82] to prohibit any
mitigation plan from being repeated and ensure the convergence of the algorithm.
∑𝑞|𝐻̂
𝑘 =0 𝐻𝑞 + ∑𝑞|𝐻̂
𝑘 =1(1 − 𝐻𝑞 ) ≥ 1
𝑞

𝑞
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𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾

(3.27)

3.3.3.3

Algorithm 𝑴𝒊𝒏𝑴𝒂𝒙𝑫𝑨:
At iteration 𝑘 of this algorithm, we refer to the optimal objective value of the

master problem 𝐼𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑘 as 𝑍 𝑘 𝑚𝑖𝑛 , and the optimal objective value of the sub problem as
𝑘 );
𝑍𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑯̂

Step (1) Initialize upper bound and lower bound: 𝑍̅𝑈𝐵 = ∞, 𝑍𝐿𝐵 = 0, and set the
iteration counter 𝑘 = 1. Set the mitigation plan and the pyro-terror attack
̂𝑘 = {} , 𝜙 𝑘 = {}. Set the current mitigation plan as the best
plan to null: 𝑯
̂𝑘 ;
found so far: 𝑯∗ = 𝑯
̂𝑘 , compute the values
Step (2) Given the mitigation fuel management program 𝑯
̂𝑘 ) to find the
̂ ) and then solve the sub-problem 𝑀𝐶𝑃𝑇𝑃(𝑯
of 𝐿𝑟,𝑗 (𝑯
̂𝑘 . The
optimal pyro-terror attack represented by a fire ignition point 𝐹
bound on the damage caused by the corresponding pyro-terror attack is
𝑍 𝑘 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ;
̅ = 𝑍 𝑘 𝑚𝑎𝑥 and update the best fuel
Step (3) If 𝑍 𝑘 𝑚𝑎𝑥 < 𝑍̅𝑈𝐵 , then set 𝑍𝑈𝐵
̂𝑘 ;
management program 𝑯∗ = 𝑯
Step (4) If 𝑍̅𝑈𝐵 − 𝑍𝐿𝐵 ≤ 𝜀; stop, the algorithm has converged to an 𝜀 − 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙
mitigation plan;
̂𝑘 , and
Step (5) Update the set of pyro-terror attack 𝜙 𝑘 with the newly found 𝐹
then update the master problem 𝐼𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑘 : all the constraints (3.21)
̂𝑘 , which is
through (3.24) need to be updated to include the new attack 𝐹
added as a new ignition point to the model, and, accordingly, a new set of
constraints (3.21) through (3.24) will be generated. Next, solve the
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updated master problem, 𝐼𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑘 , for a new mitigation plan and find
̂𝑘 ;
𝑍 𝑘 𝑚𝑖𝑛 and a new mitigation plan 𝑯
Step (6) If 𝑍 𝑘 𝑚𝑖𝑛 > 𝑍𝐿𝐵 , then set 𝑍𝐿𝐵 = 𝑍 𝑘 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ;
Step (7) If 𝑍̅𝑈𝐵 − 𝑍𝐿𝐵 ≤ 𝜀, stop, the algorithm has converged to an 𝜀 − 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙
mitigation plan;
Step (8) set k = k + 1 and go to step (2);
̂𝑘 ) is always feasible. Even when every cell in the landscape has
Note: 𝑀𝐶𝑃𝑇𝑃(𝑯
been treated (interdicted); starting a fire at any cell will burn that cell, and
𝑘 ) = 1.
𝑍𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑯̂

Note: 𝐼𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑘 is always feasible. By setting 𝐻𝑟 = 0 ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝐶, and 𝑌𝑠,𝑟 = 1 ∀ 𝑟 ∈
𝐶, ∀ 𝑠 ∈ 𝜙, the model is linear; for the remaining variables, 𝑇𝑠,𝑟 ∀ 𝑟 ∈
𝐶, ∀ 𝑠 ∈ 𝜙, a feasible solution can be found by solving the shortest path
problem for each origin ∀ 𝑠 ∈ 𝜙 and destination ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶.
̅ is updated, we need to check whether the 𝜀 −
Whenever 𝑍𝐿𝐵 or 𝑍𝑈𝐵
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 mitigation plan has been achieved; that is why the stopping
criteria is checked both in step (4) and in step (7).
Note: The master problem grows in size as more cuts are added and more
constraints and variables are added to the model. At step (5), however,
when adding constraints (3.23) and (3.24) for each new ignition point,
instead of considering all target points ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶, we can only consider the
target points 𝑟 ∈ 𝐶 that are reachable by the fire. The one-to-all shortest
path problem can be solved for this purpose. Only those target cells whose
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shortest path’s length is less than or equal to duration d (cells reachable by
fire within duration d) need to be considered. This realization eliminates
some unnecessary variables and constraints and speeds up the algorithm.
3.4

Experimentation
Fuel management programs can influence fire behavior differently based on their

spatial layouts [31]. Identifying the best fuel treatment layout to interdict pyro-terrorism
and mitigate its consequences is a challenging problem. We have arbitrarily picked three
small landscapes from the U.S. national forests for experimentation. Here, we implement
our pyro-terrorism mitigation model on these test landscapes to identify the optimal fuel
management plan that can optimally mitigate a pyro-terror attack.
3.4.1

Test landscapes
The first test case is taken from the landscape of Santa Fe National Forest in

northern New Mexico. A prevailing west to east wind is assumed for this case at 12 miles
per hour (19.31 km per hour). The second test case is taken from the landscape of
Umpqua National Forest located at the western slopes of the Cascade Mountains in
Oregon. The same wind condition is assumed. The third test case is taken from the
landscape of San Bernardino National Forest located in the San Bernardino Mountains of
California. For this test case, a prevailing west to east wind at 12 miles per hour is
assumed. Figure 3.3 shows the approximate locations of these landscapes.
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Figure 3.3

The approximate locations of the test case landscapes

Similar to a study by [31], we clip an area of 1.8 km by 1.8 km (the area is
arbitrarily chosen) from these landscapes and rasterize them into 10 × 10 square cells,
each 180 m by 180 m. To calculate the rate of spread and major fire spread directions
under these conditions for these three landscapes, we use FlamMap 5.0 with the
LANDFIRE database [105] providing the landscape files (LCP) for these test cases.
LANDFIRE data are commonly used in wildland fire simulation modeling, as they are
standardized and updated regularly to adjust to disturbances such as wildfires, fuel
treatment, and urban development [20]. Landscape files (LCP) contain spatial data
themes such as fuel models, elevation, slope, aspect and canopy characteristics. FlamMap
inputs these data along with wind speed, wind direction, and fuel moisture conditions to
compute rate of spread (ROS) and the major direction of fire spread in each cell.
We use the same initial fuel moisture conditions for the three test cases in our
study (Table 3.3). The outputs of FlamMap (the rate of spread and the major direction of
fire spread in each cell) are used to model fire spread in the landscapes using a minimum
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travel time algorithm. Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 show major fire spread
directions (degree) and rate of spread (meter/minute) along the major fire spread
directions for the three test cases. To calculate the impact of wildfires with optimally
located ignition points, we implement the model using Python 2.7 and solve it with
Gurobi 6.0 [64]. All tests are performed on a computer with an Intel Core i5 2520M
processor at 2.5 GHz and 8 GB RAM
Table 3.3

Initial fuel moisture conditions used in FlamMap
1 hour initial moisture
10 hour initial moisture
100 hours initial moisture
Herbaceius fuel moisture
Live woody fuel moisture

Figure 3.4

6
7
8
60
90

Santa Fe data heat map

Santa Fe landscape test case; (a) Major fire spread direction (degree),
(b) Rate of spread (meter/minute) along the major fire spread directions
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Figure 3.5

Umpqua data heat map

Umpqua landscape test case; (a) Major fire spread direction (degree),
(b) Rate of spread (meter/minute) along the major fire spread directions

Figure 3.6

San Bernardino data heat map

San Bernardino landscape test case; (a) Major fire spread direction (degree),
(b) Rate of spread (meter/minute) along the major fire spread directions
The Umpqua test case has an average ROS of 1.2 (meter/minute), which is higher
than that of the Santa Fe test case, with an average ROS of 0.4 (meter/minute). The San
Bernardino test case has an average ROS of 1.7 (meter/minute), the highest of these test
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cases. The higher the ROS for a landscape, the faster fire grows and the more damage it
causes to the landscape before it is suppressed.
3.4.2
3.4.2.1

Computational experiments
Optimal pyro-terrorism fuel management plan (PFMP)
By solving our pyro-terrorism mitigation model to optimality, we can compute the

percentage of the area burned and find the optimal spatial allocation for the fuel
management strategy to mitigate a pyro-terror attack. The results indicate that the optimal
fuel management plan can mitigate the impact of pyro-terrorism on the three landscape
test cases (Table 3.4). As expected, the San Bernardino test case has been affected the
most with pyro-terrorism (100 % burned when no fuel management is conducted). This is
likely due to the characteristics of this landscape that influence the rate of spread and the
major fire spread direction. As mentioned earlier, the San Bernardino test case has the
highest ROS.
We term the fuel management plan that resulted from solving our model the Pyroterrorism Fuel Management Plan (PFMP). Following Minas et al. [10], we consider three
scenarios for the fuel treatment budget: 2%, 5% and 10%. The results indicate that the
PFMP with a 10% budget can mitigate the impact of a pyro-terror attack by more than
42%, 46% and 41% respectively for the Santa Fe, Umpqua, and San Bernardino test
cases (Table 3.4). Even the PFMP with a small budget (2%) can mitigate the impact of
pyro-terrorism by 13.9% on average over the three landscape test cases.
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Table 3.4

The impact of PFMP
Landscape
Santa Fe
Umpqua
San Bernardino
Average

% landscape treated
2%
5%
10%
25.00
30.77
42.31
13.70
32.88
46.58
3.00
18.00
41.00
13.9
27.22
43.30

The percent improvement in area burned when the PFMP is implemented
Table 3.5

Computation time
Landscape
Santa Fe
Umpqua
San Bernardino

2%
7
8
3

% landscape treated
5%
10%
37
2,139
171
4,716
570
32,722

Computation times (seconds) for solving the pyro-terrorism mitigation problem
for test landscapes with different fuel management budgets
Table 3.5 shows the computation time for solving the pyro-terrorism mitigation
problem using the 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐷𝐴. As the budget for fuel management grows, the
computation time for solving the PTMP model increases.
3.4.2.2

A Wildfire Fuel Management Plan (WFMP) v.s. Pyro-terrorism Fuel
Management Plan (PFMP)
A fuel management program designed for mitigating a wildfire does not consider

the threat of a pyro-terror attack, and, therefore, we hypothesize that it cannot optimally
mitigate a pyro-terror attack. To investigate this hypothesis, we conduct an experiment to
compare the effectiveness of a fuel management program developed for wildfires
(WFMP) with the fuel management program developed for pyro-terrorism (PFMP); we
use Wei’s model [31] to develop the WFMP. The results indicate that with a low fuel
management budget, the difference between the two fuel management programs is small,
averaging 2.55% (Table 3.6). However, with a larger budget, the differences are more
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significant: 7.85% and 10.49%, respectively, for fuel management programs with 5% and
10% budgets.
The PFMP is designed to mitigate pyro-terrorism and, as is shown in Table 3.6, it
is more effective in mitigating pyro-terrorism than the WFMP. However, the PFMP may
not be as effective in mitigating natural wildfires (we use natural wildfires and wildfires
interchangeably). To investigate this hypothesis, we draw a comparison between the
effects of the PFMP and those of the WFMP for wildfires. Figure 3.7, Figure 3.8 and
Figure 3.9 illustrate the performance of the WFMP and the PFMP for both natural
wildfires and pyro-terrorism. These results indicate that the PFMP is also effective in
mitigating wildfires but not as effective as the WFMP. As can be seen in Figure 3.9, there
is a noticeable difference between the two fuel treatment plans for the San Bernardino
landscape test case when a wildfire occurs; however, for the Santa Fe and Umpqua
landscape test cases, the differences are small.
Table 3.6

WFMP v.s. PFMP: A comparison
Fuel
management plan
WFMP
Santa Fe
PFMP
Difference
WFMP
Umpqua
PFMP
Difference
WFMP
San
Bernardino
PFMP
Difference
Average difference
Landscape

% landscape treated
2%
5%
10%
23.08 23.08 26.92
25.00 30.77 42.31
1.92
7.69 15.39
10.96 26.03 31.51
13.70 32.88 46.58
2.74
6.85 15.07
0.00
9.00 40.00
3.00 18.00 41.00
3.00
9.00
1.00
2.55
7.85 10.49

A comparison between the WFMP and the PFMP: The percent improvement in landscape
burned by a pyro-terror attack when different fuel management programs with different
budgets are implemented.
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For the San Bernardino test case, not conducting any fuel management leads to a
complete burn of the landscape (Figure 3.9), while a fuel management program with 10%
budget can mitigate pyro-terrorism by more than 41%, as shown in Table 3.6. Also, for
this test case, when the budget is 10%, the difference between the WFMP and the PFMP
under pyro-terrorism is small; however, when the budget is 9%, the difference is again
noticeable (Figure 3.9).

Figure 3.7

Percent area burned Santa Fe

Percent area burned for Santa Fe landscape test case; the WFMP and the PFMP under
pyro-terrorism and wildfires

Figure 3.8

Percent area burned Umpqua

Percent area burned for Umpqua landscape test case; the WFMP and the PFMP under
pyro-terrorism and wildfires
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Figure 3.9

Percent area burned San Bernardino

Percent area burned for San Bernardino landscape test case; the WFMP and the PFMP
under pyro-terrorism and wildfires
After plotting the spatial distribution of fuel treatment for the WFMP for this case,
we realize that, when the budget is 10%, the San Bernardino landscape test case is
divided into two halves under this fuel treatment plan (Figure 3.10). Therefore, when the
adversary attacks either half, the fire burns that half completely (because of the high ROS
in San Bernardino test case); however, the fire cannot reach the other half.
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Figure 3.10

San Bernardino fuel management layout
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Figure 3.11

Santa Fe fuel management layout
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Figure 3.12

Umpqua fuel management layout

As a result, the difference between the PFMP and the WFMP in this case when
the budget is 10% is small. However, for smaller budgets, the difference is more
significant. Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 show the spatial layouts for the WFMP and the
PFMP for the two other test cases.
Figure 3.13 shows the fire foot print of a pyro-terror attack on the Santa Fe
landscape test case. It shows three scenarios: (1) when no fuel management plan is
conducted on the landscape, (2) when the PFMP with 10% budget is conducted on the
landscape, and (3) when the WFMP with a 10% budget is conducted on the landscape. As
is shown in this figure, the impact of pyro-terrorism is less on this landscape when the
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PFMP is conducted, as opposed to when no fuel management plan is conducted at all or
when the WFMP is conducted.

Figure 3.13

Pyro-terrorism fire footprint for Santa Fe test case

Santa Fe landscape test case; fire footprint of pyro-terror attacks with and without fuel
management
3.5

Discussions
In this paper, we have presented the first optimization model for mitigating a

pyro-terror attack. The model spatially allocates fuel treatment through a landscape such
that it mitigates the impact of the resulting wildfire. We have demonstrated the use of this
model on three landscape test cases with differing fuel management budgets. Of these
three cases, the San Bernardino test case is the most vulnerable to pyro-terrorism. When
no fuel treatment is scheduled, a pyro-terror attack will burn 100% of this landscape;
proportionally, this massive devastation is two times greater than that of the Santa Fe test
case. This significant increase in damage is likely due to a higher rate of fire spread; the
higher the rate of spread, the faster the fire can grow, and the more damaging the fire can
be to the landscape in a given amount of time. The average rate of spread for the San
Bernardino case is 1.7 (meter/minute), more than that of Umpqua at 1.2 (meter/minute)
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and Santa Fe at 0.4 (meter/minute). However, these landscapes also have different major
fire spread directions, and this difference can affect their vulnerability to wildfires as
well.
Our results indicate that fuel management, even on a small scale, if appropriately
allocated on a landscape, can mitigate the impact of pyro-terrorism. An optimal fuel
management plan for pyro-terrorism (PFMP) with a 2% budget can mitigate the impact
of a pyro-terror attack by 25%, 13% and 3% for the Santa Fe, Umpqua and San
Bernardino test cases, respectively. Our results indicate that the rate of spread is also
important in the effectiveness of the fuel treatment plan. The PFMP is less effective on
the San Bernardino test case than it is on the Umpqua and Santa Fe test cases. However,
as the budget for fuel treatment increases, so does the effectiveness of fuel treatment on
mitigating pyro-terrorism. The PFMP with a 10% budget can mitigate the impact of pyroterrorism by 41% for the San Bernardino test case, a significant improvement. Similarly,
the PFMP can mitigate pyro-terrorism by 46.58% and 42.31% for the Santa Fe and
Umpqua test cases, respectively.
We have compared the effectiveness of the PFMP versus the WFMP (an optimal
fuel management plan designed to mitigate natural wildfires) for mitigating pyroterrorism. The two fuel management plans have different layouts, and our results show
that the spatial layout of a fuel treatment allocation is an important factor in its
effectiveness in mitigating a pyro-terror attack. As we have illustrated, a fuel
management layout designed to mitigate a natural wildfire (i.e. WFMP) is not as effective
for mitigating the impact of pyro-terrorism. For example, for the San Bernardino case, the
PFMP with 2% budget can mitigate pyro-terrorism by 3%, the WFMP with 2% budget
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has no impact at all. Although the differences between the effectiveness of the WFMP
and the PFMP are small for all test cases, as the budget for fuel treatment increases, the
difference between the two fuels treatment plans increases as well. With a 10% fuel
treatment budget, the PFMP, on average, is more than 15% more effective in mitigating
pyro-terrorism than the WFMP for the Santa Fe and Umpqua test cases. However, there
is an exception for the San Bernardino case; the difference between the PFMP and the
WFMP is about 1%. This is because with a 10% budget, the WFMP (almost) equally
divides the landscape into two pieces and since it is assumed that the adversary only uses
single-point pyro-terror attacks, the WFMP can prevent the fire from reaching the other
half of the landscape. This layout makes the WFMP (with a 10% budget) almost as
effective as the PFMP (with a 10% budget) for the San Bernardino test case. Overall, the
PFMP with 10% budget is, on average, more than 10% more effective in mitigating pyroterrorism than the WFMP with a 10% budget. This indicates that a fuel treatment plan
that has been optimally designed to mitigate wildfires (i.e. WFMP) is not as effective in
mitigating pyro-terrorism (i.e. arson-induced wildfire). This result is consistent with what
Kim et al. [27] reported for arson-induced wildfires.
Our results indicate that for the Santa Fe and Umpqua test cases, the PFMP is
effective under both natural wildfires and pyro-terrorism conditions. Although the
WFMP is more effective than the PFMP in mitigating natural wildfires, the difference
between these two fuel treatment plans are small for the Santa Fe and Umpqua test cases.
Considering the weaker performance of the WFMP against pyro-terrorism, the PFMP can
be a more robust fuel treatment plan for these landscape test cases. A common
characteristic of the Santa Fe and Umpqua test cases is that, on average, they have
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smaller rate of spread than the San Bernardino case. Therefore, this result might be also
applicable to other landscape test cases with low rates of spread; conducting the PFMP
might be a better alternative than the WFMP for those cases. For those landscapes, the
PFMP is a more robust fuel management plan and makes the landscapes resilient against
worst-case wildfires and pyro-terrorism. However, this requires more investigation that is
beyond the scope of this work. The San Bernardino landscape test case is the most
vulnerable of all under both natural wildfires and pyro-terrorism conditions. Although
conducting fuel treatment in a small scale (e.g. 2%) cannot effectively mitigate wildfires
and pyro-terrorism for this case, fuel management in a larger scale (e.g. 10%) is effective;
we speculate the high rate of spread is the reason for that. For this landscape, the
difference between the WFMP and the PFMP under wildfire conditions when the fuel
management budget is 10% is larger than that of the Santa Fe and Umpqua landscape test
cases. Therefore, for this case, the PFMP cannot be recommended for mitigating
wildfires.
The computation time for 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐷𝐴 is different for each landscape test case
and for different budgets. The difficulty of 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐷𝐴 lies in solving the master
problem that allocates fuel management spatially in a landscape. The percentage of
landscape treated (which is dependent on the fuel management budget) is an important
factor in computation efforts required to solve the master problem. For larger fuel
management budgets, the problem is more difficult to solve.
Also, the larger the size of a landscape, the more difficult the pyro-terrorism
mitigation problem is. Solving the mitigation problem for larger landscapes (modeled as
large networks) requires a more efficient method to solve the corresponding master
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problem. We leave this challenge for future studies. However, since the problem is a
strategic level decision making problem, the computation time can be tolerated depending
on the benefit-cost ratio of the solution.
3.6
3.6.1

Conclusions and future work
Conclusion
In this research, we investigated the possibility of mitigating a pyro-terrorism

wildfire using fuel management. We modeled this problem as a bilevel min-max
optimization problem and developed a decomposition algorithm to solve it. We restricted
our study only to acts of pyro-terrorism with one ignition point. Our results indicate that
fuel management can effectively be used to mitigate a potential pyro-terrorism attack (or
worst-case wildfires).
3.6.2

Future work
The proposed model has been presented in a simple and general form. However,

the model could be readily adapted without significantly changing its structure to include
a fire duration distribution. Additionally, the model can be extended to include Wildland
Urban Interface (WUI) by adjusting cell values used in the objective function (3).
In addition to the ignition location, the number of ignition points also increases
the damage caused by a pyro-terrorism attack [45]. One can study the pyro-terrorism
mitigation problem with multiple ignition points (multiple concurrent fires); however,
such a problem is more difficult to solve. Increasing the number of ignition points causes
the master problem to grow exponentially, and the number of iterations can grow as well.
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We have investigated the effect of fuel management in mitigating pyro-terrorism
assuming that it can be successfully suppressed within a time d. This requires an
appropriate response from fire managers that are expected to dispatch fire control
resources from bases to which they have already been deployed. However, a pyroterrorist can observe the locations, types, and amount of these resources and plan an
attack accordingly. A network interdiction approach can be used for optimally deploying
the resources to bases such that the impact of pyro-terrorism can be mitigated.
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CHAPTER IV
AN ATTACKER-DEFENDER MODEL FOR ANALYZING THE VULNERABILITY
OF INITIAL ATTACK IN FIGHTING THE WORST CASE
WILDFIRES AND PYRO-TERRORISM
4.1

Introduction
In this paper, we study the vulnerability analysis of initial attack (IA) in

controlling pyro-terrorism and worst case wildfires. IA is used as the primary suppression
response to control a wildfire after its discovery. Wildfire managers use initial attack to
contain a wildfire before it grows large and becomes difficult to suppress. IA is usually
planned using historical wildfires data such as ignition locations and number of fires.
However, unlike natural wildfires, in which the ignition locations are located randomly,
pyro-terrorists can use coordinated wildfires [45] which are more difficult to control. Our
goal in this paper is to evaluate the vulnerability of IA to these worst case wildfires and
get managerial insights.
There are two general types of wildfires: natural wildfires and human-caused
wildfires. Human caused wildfires account for a large majority of all wildfire incidences:
e.g., more than 95% of wildfires in Mediterranean region and in Southern California are
caused by humans [73–75]. A study in Spain found that more than 71% of all wildfires
are caused by people [76]. Of those human-caused wildfires, only 22.5% (16% of all
wildfires) were due to negligence while 77.5% (55% of all wildfires) were intentional
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[76]. Because of the destructive power of wildfires, authorities are concerned about the
possibility of using wildfires as a means of terrorism [15,16].
Pyro-terrorism is the use of large-scale arson attacks by non-state organizations to
terrorize, intimidate or coerce a government or the civilian population in order to advance
political or social objectives [13]. Pyro-terrorism possesses the major elements of
terrorism: targeting of noncombatants, political motivation, and organized violence with
psychological impacts [11,12,14]. Pyro-terrorism has been documented in France, Spain,
and Greece [11,12]. Pyro-terror wildfires are more destructive than natural wildfires [45],
as the arsonists can make decisions about the location, time, and quantity of fires. It is
therefore important for decision makers to anticipate potential threats and implement
countermeasures to avoid a potentially devastating disaster. In this study, we investigate
the capability of initial attack resources for responding to pyro-terrorism, or worst-case
wildfires.
It has been long understood that a vigorous, rapid IA can contain a fire quickly
before it grows large and causes substantial damage [43]. IA is the primary suppression
attempt in containing a wildfire within the first several hours of fire discovery. Although
the majority of wildfire incidents have been reported to be contained by IA, more than
97% of the total area burned by wildfires have been caused by fires that have escaped IA
[36]. Therefore, successfully containing a fire using IA is very important [37,38].
Initial attack planning consists of two types of allocation decisions. First is the
deployment decision in which wildfire managers assign suppression resources to fire
bases1 to minimize operating costs, subject to fire bases capacity, while meeting resource
1

The locations where initial attack resources are located.
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requirements for suppressing potential fires in coming days, weeks, or months. Second is
the dispatch decision for the time when fires occur. Dispatch decisions include
determining the number and type of suppression resources to dispatch to fires which are
subject to resource availability, and dispatching costs.
To improve the efficiency of IA, researchers have developed several optimization
models with different structures and fire containment rules, e.g. a dynamic programming
model for IA dispatching decisions [106], a mixed integer programming (MIP) model for
dispatching fire suppression resources to a fire across multiple time steps [107], MIP
models for containing fires at multiple locations while they are competing for suppression
resources [108,109], and a MIP model to allocate control locations one fire to minimize
fire loss [110].
All these models are deterministic. To make the IA decisions, the wildfire
managers face substantial uncertainty about the number, location, and intensity of fires as
resources are deployed to fire bases before the number, location and intensity of fires are
known [35]. To incorporate the uncertainties affiliated with wildfires in an IA decision
making, a number of researchers have developed two stage stochastic programming
models in which the acquisition and deployment decision of resources takes place in the
first stage of the model, and the dispatching of those resources to fire locations takes
place in the second stage of the model [35,39–44]. In these models, the deployment and
dispatching of resources are planned based on the average impact of fires considering
multiple ignition location scenarios using historical data.
However, unlike the natural wildfires that are subject to those uncertainties, in
pyro-terror wildfires the adversaries can facilitate the conditions for a more severe
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wildfire. For example, the adversaries can choose to ignite a fire on a day with suitable
wind and low humidity, and coordinate fire ignition locations such that the resulting
wildfire poses the maximum damage to the land. Rashidi et al [45] showed that
coordinating ignition locations can have a significant impact on the severity of a wildfire.
However, as suppressing of wildfires is concerned, the distance of fire locations from fire
bases also becomes important. The adversaries can identify the optimal locations for fires
after observing fire bases and the available fire suppression resources at those fire bases
so that it will be more difficult for wildfire managers to suppress the fires. Therefore, we
can expect a pyro-terror wildfire with coordinated ignition points, equivalently a worstcase wildfire, to be more devastating and more difficult to suppress than a typical wildfire
with average impact. However, the IA decision making in most of recent literature is
planned based on the average scenario and not the worst case scenario. In this research,
we study the effectiveness of IA in containing worst case wildfires, and pyro-terrorism.
Vulnerability assessment studies identify weak points in the system, and focus on
defined threats that could compromise the system’s ability to meet its intended function.
Determining the vulnerability of a system is an important component of risk assessment,
which is employed to help develop risk mitigation strategies to counter risks [22]. Risk
assessment has increasingly become a key input to wildfire management [18–20,49]. To
our knowledge, no study has been done on vulnerability assessment of IA when
responding to pyro-terrorism or worst case wildfires. This paper aims to fill this gap by
proposing a mathematical programming model to identify the vulnerability of initial
attack. The resulting managerial insights of this study can help wildfire managers in
planning an initial attack strategy that is robust against worst case scenarios.
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We model a natural landscape as a grid network and model the spread of fires in
the landscape and the initial attack as a network optimization problem. To model
wildfire’s behavior in a landscape, we use FlamMap [56], a fire behavior mapping and
analysis program. We develop a Stackelberg game model for analyzing the vulnerability
of initial attack when responding to pyro-terrorism or worst-case wildfires in that
landscape. The arsonists, acting as the first player, observe the locations and amount of
fire suppression resources, and having perfect knowledge of fire spread and weather
condition, they start fires across the landscape so that the number of fires that cannot be
contained by IA (escaped fires), and the resulting damage to the landscape are
maximized. The wildfire managers, on the other hand, observe the location of fires, and
optimally dispatch the available suppression resources to contain the fires. We then use
the model to evaluate the vulnerability of IA on a test case problem for a landscape
clipped out of Santa Fe National forest, located in Western U.S.
We believe this to be the first study that analyzes the vulnerability of initial attack
when responding to the worst case wildfires and pyro-terrorism. Identifying the
vulnerability of initial attack can help wildfire managers in developing a more robust
suppression strategy that can successfully respond to the worst case scenario wildfires,
and pyro-terrorism. The contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) Proposing the first
mathematical model for studying the vulnerability of initial attack, and (2) developing a
decomposition algorithm to solve the model.
4.2

Vulnerability assessment of initial attack problem (VAIAP)
The problem of vulnerability assessment of initial attack is as follows.

Adversaries, having observed the location of bases and the suppression resources, choose
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a pyro-terror attack plan 𝑾 (a set of specific fire ignition locations), selecting the most
vulnerable area in the landscape to start a wildfire that spreads quickly as is difficult to
contain; in other words, it causes the maximum damage. Next, the wildfire managers,
detecting the location of fires, attack the fires using an optimal dispatching of resources 𝑫
to contain the fires and minimize the number of escaped fires and the acreage they could
burn. In this section we develop a Stackelberg game model for the VAIAP. It is a bi-level
integer programming model with the adversaries’ problem represented with the outer
level model, and the wildfire managers’ problem represented with the inner level model.
Both the wildfire managers’ problem and the adversaries’ problem are modeled as
network optimization problems.
4.2.1

Modeling fire behavior in a landscape
To model fire behavior in a landscape, we consider a landscape divided into a

number of raster cells representing potential fire ignition points. If we represent the center
of each cell as a node, and connect neighboring cells with directed arcs (Figure 4.1) we
will have a bidirectional network [45]. This bidirectional network implies that fire can
burn up and down slopes and with and into the wind. We use FlamMap [56], a fire
behavior mapping and analysis program to compute the rate of fire spread on each of
those arcs. FlamMap uses Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data, landscape
characteristics, fuel moisture, and wind conditions and computes the major fire spread
direction and the rate of spread (ROS) along the major fire spread direction for each cell.
We then use the Minimum Travel Time algorithm (MTT) [58] to model the spread of fire
through the landscape. MTT has also been used in wildfire simulation programs such as
FlamMap [56], FsPro [78], and FSim [79].
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Figure 4.1

4.2.2

A landscape modeled as a bidirectional network

Problem description and model formulation
In our model, the adversaries are assumed to have complete knowledge about

weather and the topography of the landscape. They are also aware of the location of fire
bases and the available suppression resources at each fire base. Having this complete
knowledge, they identify an optimal set of ignition points across the landscape to start
fires that are difficult for wildfire managers to contain, using initial attack, and the
maximum acreage is burned by the escaped fires2. The wildfire managers, after detecting
fire locations, initiate an optimal initial attack by optimally dispatching the fire
suppression resources from fire bases to fire locations. The wildfire managers’ objective
is to control the fires and minimize the number of escaped fires and the acreage they
could burn; thus, this two-player game is symmetric. In this model, the wildfire managers
are assumed to use optimal dispatching of resources which requires wildfire managers to
have perfect knowledge about fire suppression requirements and the ability to anticipate
the amount of resources needed from each fire base to control the fire. However, in
reality, wildfire managers do not have perfect knowledge about weather and the

2

Escaped fires are those fires that cannot be contained using initial attack.
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landscape, and cannot use optimal dispatching of resources. Therefore, the vulnerability
assessment gained with our model is a lower bound for the real problem.
The primary assumptions of this research are as follows: (1) The fire area
containment rate of the fire suppression resource are known. (2) Wildfire managers have
perfect knowledge of the amount of resources required to control each fire. (3) All cells
have high fire intensity. (4) There is no interaction between fires.
The notations used in the model are as follows:
Table 4.1

Notations

Sets and indices
is the set of raster cells in a landscape indexed with 𝑗
𝐶
is the set of potential fire ignition locations indexed with 𝑓
𝐹
is the set of operating bases indexed with 𝑏
𝐵
is the set of resources type indexed with 𝑟
𝑅
Parameters
Φ𝑏,𝑟,𝑓

fire containment area built by 𝑇 by resource 𝑟 dispatched from operating base
𝑏 to fire 𝑓

π𝑓,𝑗

if cell 𝑗 reached and burned by fire 𝑓 within fire duration 𝑇

φ𝑗

the area of cell 𝑗

Δ𝑓

total area burned by fire ignited at location 𝑓 (∑𝑗∈𝐶 φ𝑗 π𝑓,𝑗 𝑤𝑓 ) within fire
duration 𝑇;

𝛽

the pyro-terrorists’ budget (number of fires the terrorists ignite)

𝑄𝑏,𝑟

the number of resources of type 𝑟 available at operating base 𝑏

Variables
𝑍𝑓

1 if the fire ignited at location 𝑓 is contained with initial attack, 0 otherwise;

𝑊𝑓

1 if a fire is ignited at location 𝑓, 0 otherwise;

𝑌𝑏,𝑟,𝑓

the number of resources of type 𝑟 dispatched from operating base 𝑏 to the
fire ignited at location 𝑓;
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The mathematical formulation for the vulnerability assessment of initial attack
problem (VAIAP) is as follows:
VAIAP: 𝐴∗ = max𝑾∈Ξ (𝑚𝑖𝑛𝒀∈Ψ(𝑾) ∑𝑓∈𝐹(1 − 𝑍𝑓 ) Δ𝑓 )

(4.1)

Where the set Ξ is defined as the set of all 𝑾 such that
∑𝑓∈𝐹 𝑊𝑓 ≤ 𝛽

(4.2)

𝑊𝑓 ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹

(4.3)

and the set Ψ(𝑾) is defined by
Δ𝑓 𝑍𝑓 𝑊𝑓 ≤ ∑𝑏∈𝐵 ∑𝑟∈𝑅 Φ𝑏,𝑟,𝑓 𝑌𝑏,𝑟,𝑓

∀𝑓 ∈𝐹

∑𝑓∈𝐹 𝑌𝑏,𝑟,𝑓 ≤ 𝑄𝑏,𝑟 ∀𝑏 ∈ 𝐵, ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅
𝑌𝑏,𝑟,𝑓 ∈ ℤ

∀𝑓 ∈ 𝐹, ∀𝑏 ∈ 𝐵, ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅

𝑍𝑓 ∈ {0, 1}

∀ 𝑓∈𝐹

(4.4)
(4.5)
(4.6)
(4.7)

This is a bilevel optimization problem with the arsonists’ problem in the outer
level, and the wildfire managers’ problem in the inner level. The objective function (4.1)
includes maximizing the area burned (represented by A) by the escaped fires caused by a
pyro-terror attack in the outer level (the attacker problem) while minimizing that in the
inner level (the defender problem). We assume that fire managers can see the terrorists’
attack, the number and locations of fires. The arsonists’ pyro-terror attack plan is
restricted by constraints (4.2) and (4.3). Constraint (4.2) sets the limit for the number of
fires the terrorists can start. Constraints (4.3) are variable type constraints.
For any specific pyro-terror attack plan 𝑾 chosen by the adversaries, the wildfire
managers problem is restricted to set Ψ(𝑾), as defined by constraints (4.4) through (4.7).
Instead of using predefined values for evaluating containment of a fire as in Haight and
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Fried, and Lee et al. [39,43], we directly model fire containment condition by comparing
the size of fire area at time 𝑇 and the size of fire containment area built by suppression
resources at time 𝑇. We use containment area construction instead of line construction as
used in [35,42,111]. In our model, computing the area of a fire is simpler than its
perimeter, therefore, we do not use perimeter for this reason. The containment condition
is enforced using constraints (4). Fire set at location 𝑓 is considered contained (𝑍𝑓 = 1) if
the total containment area built by the suppression resources dispatched to that fire is
greater than or equal to the area burnt by that fire by time 𝑇. To ensure that no more
resources than what is available at each fire base can be dispatched to fires, we enforce
constraints (4.5). Constraints (4.6) and (4.7) are variable type constraints.
It should be noted that this model only considers the dispatch decisions and not
the resource deployment decisions. In this Stackelberg game model, when attackers plan
a pyro-terror wildfire, they can observe the resources that wildfire managers have
deployed to each base. When the pyro-terrorists attack a landscape (as the first player in
this game), wildfire managers have to dispatch the available resources from fire bases to
fires to control them.
4.3

Solution methodology
The vulnerability assessment of initial attack problem (VAIAP) has a bilevel

“max-min” structure with an integer programming problem in the lower level; thus, the
lower level problem is not guaranteed a nonzero duality gap. Therefore, the problem does
not readily lend itself to the common approach of taking the dual of the inner level
problem, resulting in a single-level minimization problem. To solve the VAIAP, we
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develop a decomposition algorithm, called Bounded Decomposition Algorithm (BDA).
BDA alternates between (𝑖) a master problem, where the pyro-terrorists identify the
ignition locations to start a wildfire, and (𝑖𝑖) a sub problem, where wildfire managers,
having observed the location of fires, trigger an IA by optimally dispatching suppression
resources to control the fires. The sub-problem and master problem are presented as
follows.
4.3.1

The dispatching problem (DP) for a known pyro-terror attack
̂ ∈ Ξ (the ignition locations are known), we
For a given pyro-terror attack 𝑾

̂) which
denote the dispatching problem (sub problem) for wildfire managers as DP(𝑾
̂ and computes the
identifies the optimal dispatching of resources for wildfire scenario 𝑾
resulting containment area constructed with those resources around the fires:
̂): 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑾
̂) = min ∑𝑓∈𝐹(1 − 𝑍𝑓 ) Δ𝑓
DP(𝑾

(4.8)

̂𝑓 ≤ ∑𝑏∈𝐵 ∑𝑟∈𝑅 Φ𝑏,𝑟,𝑓 𝑌𝑏,𝑟,𝑓 ∀ 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹
Δ𝑓 𝑍𝑓 𝑊

(4.9)

∑𝑓∈𝐹 𝑌𝑏,𝑟,𝑓 ≤ 𝑄𝑏,𝑟

∀𝑏 ∈ 𝐵, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅

𝑍𝑓 ∈ {0, 1}
𝑌𝑏,𝑟,𝑓 ∈ ℤ

∀ 𝑓∈𝐹
∀𝑓 ∈ 𝐹, ∀𝑏 ∈ 𝐵, ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅

(4.10)
(4.11)
(4.12)

𝜃𝑓 = ∑𝑏∈𝐵 ∑𝑟∈𝑅 Φ𝑏,𝑟,𝑓 𝑌𝑏,𝑟,𝑓 is the containment area constructed around fire 𝑓 by
̂, and 𝛩 = ∑∀𝑓∈𝐹 𝜃𝑓 is
the optimal dispatching of resources in response to fire scenario 𝑾
the total containment area constructed by resources. Knowing wildfire managers’ optimal
dispatching plan for a specific pyro-terror attack, the initial attack vulnerability
assessment problem is equivalent to:
𝐴∗ = max𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑾)
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𝑾∈Ξ

(4.13)

Theoretically, we could solve (4.13) by enumerating the finite set of pyro-terror
̂ ∈ Ξ (representing fire location scenarios), solving DP(𝑾
̂) for each plan,
attack plans 𝑾
and choosing the pyro-terror plan that results in the maximum acreage burned by the
̂). However, in reality, Ξ is too large to enumerate. For example,
escaped fires 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑾
for a landscape rasterized into a 100,000 cells grid network, and for pyro-terror attacks
with 3-ignition points, there are 𝐶3100,000 ≅ 8.33 × 1022 fire ignition scenarios. Therefore, we
solve (4.13) with our BDA decomposition algorithm.
For solving the VAIAP problem, we need to consider two factors: (i) The ROS
value at each cell (fires grow at different rate at different locations in the landscape); (ii)
Fire base locations and the amount of suppression resources available at each base (the
location of fire bases can impact the initial attack’s response time at a given fire location).
The distance between a fire base and a fire location, along with the number of resources
available at each fire base and the resources’ speed to reach a target in the landscape can
affect the effectiveness of initial attack at each potential fire location. Indeed if we could
ignore the travel time required for a resource to reach a fire location from a fire base, then
the location of fire bases would not matter at all. In addition to that, we need to consider
that fires would compete for resources which add up to the complexity of problem. We
take these factors into consideration in developing our BDA decomposition algorithm.
4.3.2

The Bounded Decomposition Algorithm (BDA)
We decompose the VAIAP problem into a master problem, the pyro-terrorist

problem (PTP), and a sub problem, the dispatching problem (DP) shown with (4.8)
through (4.12). The PTP problem is as follows:
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PTP: Λ = m𝑎𝑥 ∑𝑓∈𝐶 𝑊𝑓 Δ𝑓

(4.14)

∑𝑓∈𝐹 𝑊𝑓 ≤ 𝛽

(4.15)

𝑊𝑓 ∈ {0, 1} ∀ 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹

(4.16)

The BDA uses PTP to identify the fire ignition location scenarios that would
result in the maximum acreage burned. Those fires, with their large potential acreage
burnt, would require a larger containment area construction to be controlled. This will
help us prioritize our search space in finding the optimal fire ignition location scenario
(i.e. the pyro-terrorism) that IA is vulnerable to.
̂ found by solving PTP, the BDA
For any given fire ignition location scenario 𝑾
̂) to compute the optimum dispatching of resources for fighting that fire, and
solves DP(𝑾
evaluates whether the fire can be contained by an IA or not. If the optimal dispatching of
̂ was able to contain the fire, the algorithm would update
resources for fire scenario 𝑾
̂ from the search space, and continue for
PTP with a constraint that would exclude 𝑾
another iteration. Otherwise, if the optimal dispatching of resources was incapable of
containing the fire, then the algorithm would stop and conclude that the IA is vulnerable
̂.
to the pyro-terror attack scenario 𝑾
In a situation where IA is not vulnerable to any wildfire scenarios, the BDA
algorithm would continue until it exhausts all the fire ignition location scenarios, which
would be computationally expensive as explained before. To avoid an exhaustive
enumeration in such a situation, we propose a lower bound (LB) on the capability of IA
on containing wildfires to bound the search space and use it as a stopping criterion. The
LB is computed using the following model:
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𝐿𝐵: 𝛩𝐿𝐵 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑𝑏,𝑟,𝑓 Φ𝑏,𝑟,𝑓 𝑌𝑏,𝑟,𝑓

(4.17)

∑𝑓∈𝐹 𝑊𝑓 ≤ 𝛽

(4.18)
∀ 𝑓∈𝐹

(4.19)

∀𝑏 ∈ 𝐵, ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅

(4.20)

∑𝑏∈𝐵 ∑𝑟∈𝑅 𝑌𝑏,𝑟,𝑓 ≤ ∑𝑏∈𝐵 ∑𝑟∈𝑅 𝑄𝑏,𝑟 𝑊𝑓
∑𝑓∈𝐹 𝑌𝑏,𝑟,𝑓 ≥ 𝑄𝑏,𝑟
𝑌𝑏,𝑟,𝑓 ∈ ℤ

∀𝑓 ∈ 𝐹, ∀𝑏 ∈ 𝐵, ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅

𝑍𝑓 ∈ {0, 1}

∀ 𝑓∈𝐹

(4.21)
(4.22)

The objective function (4.17) is to identify a fire scenario 𝑾 for which the
containment area constructed by the resources is minimum. Constraint (4.18) limits the
number of fires in a fire scenario. Constraints (4.19) ensure that the amount of resources
dispatched to a fire is less than or equal to the amount those resources that are available at
fire bases. Constraints (4.19) also ensure that resources are only dispatched to the fire
locations. Constraints (4.20) ensure that all of the available resources are dispatched to
fire locations, otherwise the model would converge to a solution that does not dispatch
any resources at all which would result to a dispatching solution with a zero containment
area. Constraints (4.21) and (4.22) are variable type constraints.
4.3.2.1

Theorem 1
𝛩𝐿𝐵 is a lower bound on the capability of IA in containing any fire scenario when

all the resources are dispatched.
̂ that uses all the resources to construct containment area
Any dispatching plan 𝐷
around a set of fires is a feasible solution for LB, and, therefore would construct a
̃ (𝑾) is the optimal dispatching plan
containment area no less than 𝛩𝐿𝐵 . Lets’ assume 𝐷
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for fire scenario 𝑾 that would construct the containment area 𝛩̃(𝑾) around an arbitrary
̃ (𝑾) is a feasible solution for LB, therefore 𝛩𝐿𝐵 ≤ 𝛩̃(𝑾). ∎
fire scenario 𝑾. Since 𝐷
In developing a lower bound for IA capability, as implied in theorem 1 above, we
only focus on fire scenarios that require dispatching of all the resources. The reason for
this is if there is a fire scenario that cannot be contained with an IA, it must be one that
depletes all the resources and, even when all the resources are dispatched, cannot be
contained. If, at any given iteration of BDA, the computed maximum acreage burned (Λ)
by the optimal pyro-terror attack found by solving PTP was less than or equal to 𝛩𝐿𝐵 ,
then the BDA algorithm could stop to avoid an exhaustive enumeration. However, it
could be the case that while the total acreage burned by a fire scenario was not greater
than the total containment area built by an IA (Λ(𝑾) ≤ 𝛩(𝑾)), there was still at least
one fire for which the containment area built was less than the acreage burned by that
fire, and therefore not enough to contain it (for example while 3 + 6 < 2 + 8, but still 3 >
2). To avoid this exception, we need to add an additional condition to the BDA algorithm
before we use LB as a stopping criterion. That is, if at any iteration of BDA, the first
condition is held (Λ ≤ 𝛩𝐿𝐵 ), then the algorithm would check to see whether the
maximum acreage burned by each individual fire is less than or equal to the minimum
containment area built by the dispatching plan in 𝛩𝐿𝐵 . If so, then the algorithm would
stop and conclude that all wildfire scenarios can be contained by IA (i.e., IA is not
vulnerable to any wildfire scenarios or pyro-terrorism).
The steps of the BDA is as follows:
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Step (1) Solve the lower bound (LB) problem for dispatching model and identify
the corresponding fire scenario for which these bounds hold. We refer to
the corresponding fire location scenario for which LB is held as 𝑾𝑳𝑩 .
Step (2) Set the iteration counter 𝑘 = 1;
̂𝑘 ) for
Step (3) Solve the master problem PTP and compute the area burned Λ(𝑾
̂𝑘 ;
the optimal pyro-terror attack 𝑾
̂𝑘 = 1}} <
̂𝑘 ) < 𝛩𝐿𝐵 , then if 𝑀𝑎𝑥 {Δ𝑓 | 𝑓 ∈ {𝑓 ∈ 𝐹|𝑾
Step (4) If Λ(𝑾
𝒇
𝑀𝑖𝑛 {𝜃𝑓 | 𝑓 ∈ {𝑓 ∈ 𝐹|𝑾𝑳𝑩 = 1}} stop, there is no pyro-terror attack that
cannot be contained;
̂𝑘 ) for the optimal pyro-terror attack
Step (5) Solve the lower level problem 𝐷𝑃(𝑾
̂𝑘 .
𝑾
̂𝑘 ) > 0, stop; the resulting fire cannot be contained and IA is
Step (6) If 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑾
̂𝑘 .
vulnerable to fir scenario 𝑾
̂𝑘 ) = 0, then set 𝑘 = 𝑘 + 1, add constraint (2.23) to the
Step (7) If 𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑾
master problem and go to Step (3).
(4.23)

∑𝑞|𝑊̂𝑘=1 𝑊𝑞 < 𝛽
𝑞

̂𝑘 from the
Constraint (4.23) excludes the latest optimal pyro-terror attack 𝑾
search space when we realize that an optimal dispatching of resources can contain the
resulting fires.
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4.4

Model demonstration

4.4.1

Test case problem
We test our model on a test case problem that is based on a small piece of

landscape extracted from the Santa Fe National Forest which is located in northern New
Mexico. The test case landscape is about 111.68 km2 (11.49 km long and 9.72 km wide).
We rasterize the landscape into a grid network with 124,092 (383 by 324) square cells,
each 30 m by 30 m wide. If we represent the center of each cell as a node, and connect
adjacent cells with directed edges, then the landscape can be represented with a directed
network. The resulting network has 124,092 nodes and 988,498 edges.
To model the spread of fire in this landscape, we use FlamMap 5.0 to compute the
rate of spread from any cell in the landscape to any of its adjacent cells. We then use the
minimum travel time algorithm (MTT) [77] to compute the time requires for fire to travel
from any point in the landscape to any other point. FlamMap requires some input data
such as fuel models, elevation, slope, aspect and canopy in addition to wind speed and
direction and fuel moisture. For this test case, we assume a prevailing west to east wind at
12 miles per hour (19.31 km per hour), similar to [45]. For our test case problem we
acquire the landscape files (LCP), containing fuel models, elevation, slope, aspect and
canopy cover, from the LANDFIRE database [105]. Table 1 shows the initial fuel
moisture conditions that we use for this problem (similar to [45]).
Table 4.2

Initial fuel moisture conditions used in FlamMap
1 hour fuel moisture
10 hour fuel moisture
100 hour fuel moisture
Herbaceous fuel moisture
Live woody fuel moisture
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Figure 4.2

The ROS heat map for the test case landscape problem.

The ROS ranges from 0 meter/minute to 55 meter/minute (darker area shows higher
ROS). Each pixel is 30 meter long and 30 meter wide.
Initial attack is generally defined as the first 1-8 hours of fire suppression effort,
during which the primary objective is to contain all the fires in the shortest possible time
[43]. Examples of initial attack resources that are used in suppressing fires are engines,
bulldozers, hand crews, and water dropping helicopters. In this test case problem, we use
three types of resources in initial attack: hand crew, small engine and large engine. This
decision is based on our discussion with Santa Fe National Forest administration. Due to
security concern, we do not use real data (such as the number and locations of resources)
when modeling the initial attack.
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Table 4.3

Initial attack resource characteristics
Resources
Hand crew
Small engine
Large engine

Average fire line
production rate (m/hour)
[35]
39
180
317

As mentioned earlier, in this research we use the area of fire containment
constructed by resources instead of the perimeter. If the area of fire containment
constructed by the dispatched resources was bigger than the area of the fire at the end of
initial attack time limit, then the fire is considered contained, otherwise, it is considered
escaped. The containment area that a resource can construct depends on its “fire area
production rate” and the available time to construct the containment area which is the
defined time limit for initial attack (i.e. the response time threshold) deducted by the time
that it takes for a resource to travel from a fire base to a fire. Table 4.3 shows the
“average fire line production rate” for the resources adapted from [35].
The response times for resources to travel between the fire bases and fire
locations are computed based on their approximate Euclidian distance and the speed of
the resources, plus a 1-hour delay between fire ignition and dispatch (time required for
detecting the fire and initiating a dispatch), similar to We et al [35]. The average speed
for these resources is assumed to be 56 km/hour (933.33 meter/minute) [35].
To solve the resulting optimization problem, we model the problem with Python
2.7 and use Gurobi Optimizer 6.5 on a desktop computer with 32 GB memory and an
Intel (R) Core ™ i7-4770S CPU at 3.1 GH running on a 64-bit Windows 7 Operating
System.
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We consider three different time limits for initial attack: 4 hours, 6 hours and 8
hours (Table 4.4Table 4.5 and Table 4.6). For all these time limit scenarios, the results
show that for pyro-terror attack fires with one ignition point, the IA can successfully
contain the fire. However, for pyro-terror attacks with more than one ignition point, IA is
incapable of containing the resulting fires.
Table 4.4

Computational results: 𝑇 = 4 hours

̂)
̂) Vulnerable
Scenario 𝛽 Computation
𝛩𝐿𝐵
Λ(𝑾
𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑾
time (sec.)
1
1
2197
972314 611100
996171
No
2
2
2229
985835 1217700 1002817
Yes
Vulnerability analysis of IA when the time limit for IA is 4 hours.
Table 4.5

Computational results: 𝑇 = 6 hours

̂)
̂) Vulnerable
Scenario 𝛽 Computation
𝛩𝐿𝐵
Λ(𝑾
𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑾
time (sec.)
1
1
2243
1491941 933300
1501865
No
2
2
2252
1494237 1855800 1501879
Yes
Vulnerability analysis of IA when the time limit for IA is 6 hours.
Table 4.6

Computational results: 𝑇 = 8 hours

̂)
̂)
Scenario 𝛽 Computation
Vulnerable
𝛩𝐿𝐵
Λ(𝑾
𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑾
time (sec.)
1
1
2278
1998344 1309500 2000342
No
2
2
2246
1998354 2614500 2002638
Yes
Vulnerability analysis of IA when the time limit for IA is 8 hours.
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Figure 4.3

Computational results

Computational results for different initial attack time limits
As seen in Figure 4.3, as the allotted time for IA increases, so does the gap
between area burned and the containment area built. This is because the rate by which the
containment area is built is constant while, the rate by which the fire grows and spreads
can be variant, depending especially on ROS. The results suggest a faster IA response is
more promising for containing a pyro-terror fire.
For pyro-terror attacks with one ignition point (when 𝛽 = 1), the BDA algorithm
is terminated by the LB stopping criteria. However, for pyro-terror attacks with more
ignition points (when 𝛽 ≥ 2), since the resulting fire cannot be contained with an IA, the
algorithm stops and concludes that the IA is vulnerable to those fires.
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4.5
4.5.1

Conclusions and future works
Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented the first optimization model for studying the

vulnerability assessment of initial attack to pyro-terror wildfires. The model is a
Stackelberg game model with max-min bilevel structure that has integer variables in the
lower level. To solve the model, we develop a decomposition algorithm named Bounded
Decomposition Algorithm (BDA).
We have demonstrated the use of this model on a test case problem, a landscape
that covers a small portion of Santa Fe National Forest, located in New Mexico. For
experimentation, we have considered three time limit scenarios for initial attack. The
results indicate that although IA can contain a pyro-terror attack with one ignition point,
when the number of ignition points increases, initial attack can no longer control the fire.
The results also suggest that a quicker response is more effective, as fire grows, it
becomes more difficult to control.
4.5.2

Future work
Initial attack includes two decisions: deploying of resources to fire bases, and

dispatching of those resources to fires when they occur. In this paper, we study the
vulnerability of initial attack when responding to pyro-terrorism based only on the
dispatching decision. Researchers have used stochastic programming models, to identify
the optimal deployment decision based on various fire location scenarios. However, in
pyro-terrorism, the ignition locations are not arbitrarily; rather, they are selected such that
the resulting fire can cause the maximum damage, and the likelihood of not being
contained is maximized. However, this depends on the resources, types and numbers, that
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are available at fire stations. One can study an optimal initial attack especially designed
for responding to pyro-terrorism by planning an optimal deployment of resources to fire
bases such that when dispatch to a pyro-terror fire, can maximally contain it.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
5.1

Conclusion
Wildfires can have serious and long-lasting impacts on ecological, social and

economic systems [21]. Because of the increase in fire activities, their significant short
and long term threats to forest ecosystems, and the danger they pose to public safety and
property, wildfires have received increased public attention. There are some concerns that
the destructive power of wildfires may attract terrorist organizations to use them as a
weapon of mass destruction [11–13]. Indeed, pyro-terrorism events have been
documented in France, Spain, and Greece [11,12,14]. It is, therefore, necessary, to
identify and understand the impact of a potential pyro-terror attack on a landscape, and
our ability to mitigate and control such a threat. In this dissertation, we study the impact
of pyro-terrorism on landscapes, and the effectiveness of initial attack in responding to
them. We also study the possibility of mitigating a pyro-terrorism fire using fuel
management.
We first study the vulnerability of landscapes to the worst case wildfires (i.e.
pyro-terrorism). We develop a maximal covering location-based formulation for the
problem. We use FlamMap to model fire behavior, and use the mathematical model to
identify the vulnerable areas in a landscape, the potential ignition locations for a pyroterror attack. We use three test case landscapes for experimentation. Our results indicate
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that pyro-terrorism wildfires with coordinated ignition points, on average, have more than
twice the impact on landscapes than natural wildfires with randomly located ignition
points.
Next, we study the problem of mitigating a pyro-terror attack with fuel
management. We model the problem as defender attacker Stackelberg game and develop
a bilevel min-max model. We develop a decomposition algorithm called MinMaxDA to
solve the problem, as it is not solvable by conventional methods. Three test case
landscapes are used for experimentation. The results indicate that fuel management, even
if conducted on small scale, can effectively mitigate the effects of a pyro-terrorism.
Suppressing a pyro-terror fire using initial attack is our focus in the next chapter.
We investigate the effectiveness of initial attack in containing a pyro-terror fire by
developing an attacker-defender Stackelberg model. The model is a bilevel max-min
model with integer variables in the lower level, therefore, we develop a decomposition
algorithm called Bounded Decomposition Algorithm (BDA) to solve the problem. We
test the model on a test case landscape extracted from the Santa Fe National Forest.
5.2

Future work
For the future research, one can study the pyro-terrorism mitigation problem with

multiple ignition points (multiple concurrent fires); however, such a problem is more
difficult to solve. Increasing the number of ignition points causes the master problem to
grow exponentially, and the number of iterations can grow as well.
When studying multiple ignition points wildfires (concurrent fires), one can take
the interaction of fires into consideration, as we neglect the interaction effects. Fire
behavior and characteristics can dramatically change in presence of another fire [70], and
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therefore, they can cause more damage that it was shown in our research, and as a result,
they can be more difficult to contain. We also did not include spot fires in this study; they
can increase wildfires risks by helping them spread faster [71]. For a more accurate
assessment, a study can include spot fires into account as well.
Initial attack includes two decisions: deploying of resources to fire bases, and
when fires occur, dispatching of those resources to fires. We studied the vulnerability of
initial attack when responding to pyro-terrorism based on dispatching the available
resources that have already been deployed to fire bases. Researchers have used stochastic
programming models, considering the uncertainty of the ignition locations using various
scenarios, to identify the optimal deployment decision. However, in pyro-terrorism, the
ignition locations are intelligently selected so that the resulting fire causes the maximum
damage, and is more difficult to contain by initial attack. One can study an optimal initial
attack especially designed for responding to pyro-terrorism by planning an optimal
deployment of resources to fire bases such that when dispatch to a pyro-terror fire, can
maximally contain it.
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